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The Inextricable Merits Problem 
in Personal Jurisdiction 
Cassandra Burke Robertson* 
In 1984, Hollywood star Shirley Jones convinced the Supreme Court to 
adopt an effects-based test for personal jurisdiction when she brought suit 
in California against a Florida defendant for defaming her reputation. 
After adopting the test in Calder v. Jones, the Court never returned to the 
issue, and in fact avoided personal jurisdiction questions entirely for more 
than two decades. This past spring, however, the Supreme Court not only 
revisited the personal jurisdiction doctrine, but also signaled an intention 
to return to personal jurisdiction issues in the near future, with two 
justices calling specifically for development of the doctrine in cases 
involving modern “commerce and communication.” When the Court 
chooses to hear such a case, it will likely be to resolve an emerging issue 
that has divided lower courts — the proper scope of the Calder effects test. 
This Article advocates limiting the effects test. It argues that many of 
the conflicting cases in this area can be reconciled only by acknowledging 
courts’ implicit assumptions about the underlying merits of the case. The 
Article then demonstrates that once these assumptions are made explicit, 
the merits of the cases are so inextricably intertwined with the 
jurisdictional issues that courts cannot resolve the jurisdictional question 
without fully trying the cases on the merits — an action that would 
require the defendant to forfeit the very constitutional interests that the 
personal jurisdiction doctrine was developed to protect. Finally, the 
Article examines how the development of the Internet destroyed previous 
assumptions about the litigation resources of likely defendants. It 
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concludes that narrowing the effects-test doctrine would minimize the cost 
of forum selection for both plaintiff and defendant, would promote online 
commercial development, and would better protect a robust speech 
environment. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Shortly after the Supreme Court released two personal jurisdiction 
opinions during the 2010 term,1 it denied two petitions for certiorari 
that it had been holding for resolution of those cases.2 Both of the 
denied petitions raised a similar question: should a defendant who 
allegedly commits an intentional tort be subject to personal 
jurisdiction in the forum where the aggrieved plaintiff lives and works, 
and where the effect of the harm was therefore felt, even if the 
defendant has no other connection with the forum state?3 Such 
jurisdiction is described as “effects-test personal jurisdiction” because 
it is based on the in-state effects of the defendant’s out-of-state 
conduct.4 Although the Supreme Court adopted the effects test in the 
1984 case Calder v. Jones,5 it has not revisited the issue. In the 
meantime, many lower courts have adopted a very narrow 
construction of the effects test that precludes jurisdiction without 
evidence of other forum-state contacts, while others have interpreted 
 
 1 See Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2846 
(2011); J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2780-84 (2011). 
 2 Clemens v. McNamee, 615 F.3d 374 (5th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 
3091 (2011); Kauffman Racing Equip., L.L.C. v. Roberts, 126 Ohio St. 3d 81, 2010-
Ohio-2551, 930 N.E.2d 784, cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 3089 (2011). 
 3 The petition for certiorari in Kauffman Racing phrased the question as 
“[w]hether the Due Process Clause permits a State to exercise personal jurisdiction 
over a nonresident defendant based solely on a claim that the defendant committed an 
intentional tort on the Internet knowing that the plaintiff resided in the forum State.” 
Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Roberts v. Kauffman Racing Equip., L.L.C., 131 S. Ct. 
3089, 3090 (2011) (No. 10-617), 2010 WL 4494141, at *i. The cert petition in 
Clemens asked, “Does the Due Process Clause require that a defamatory statement 
refer to a state and be drawn from sources in the state to permit the state to exercise 
specific personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defamation defendant?” Petition for a 
Writ of Certiorari, Clemens v. McNamee, 131 S. Ct. 3091 (2011) (No. 10-966), 2011 
WL 291140, at *ii. 
 4 See Larry Dougherty, Does a Cartel Aim Expressly? Trusting Calder Personal 
Jurisdiction When Antitrust Goes Global, 60 FLA. L. REV. 915, 927 & n.2 (2008). 
Because effects-test jurisdiction requires that the defendant intentionally target a 
particular forum, there can typically only be effects-test jurisdiction in one forum — 
even though there may be personal jurisdiction in multiple fora. See, e.g., Remick v. 
Manfredy, 238 F.3d 248, 258 (3d Cir. 2001) (“[W]e held that the Calder ‘effects test’ 
requires the plaintiff to show that: (1) The defendant committed an intentional tort; 
(2) The plaintiff felt the brunt of the harm in the forum such that the forum can be 
said to be the focal point of the harm suffered by the plaintiff as a result of that tort; 
(3) The defendant expressly aimed his tortious conduct at the forum such that the 
forum can be said to be the focal point of the tortious activity.”) (emphasis removed).  
 5 See Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 789 (1984). 
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the test more broadly.6 The court opinions underlying the denied 
petitions for certiorari took very different positions. 
Although the Supreme Court denied both petitions, the contours of 
effects-test jurisdiction remain far from settled — neither of the 
Court’s recent personal jurisdiction opinions addressed the question, 
and the courts in the two underlying cases came to different 
conclusions.7 But while the Supreme Court left the issue unresolved, 
the plurality’s emphasis in J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro on 
the need for specific forum-state targeting may lend some support to 
the courts that have adopted a more narrow reading of Calder, and it 
may suggest that the Court will be willing to reconsider effects-test 
jurisdiction in the near future.8 
When the Court does decide to take up the issue, it will have no 
problem finding a suitable case in which to do so; the number of 
effects-test cases has more than tripled in the last decade, surpassing 
the number of “stream of commerce” jurisdictional cases.9 The growth 
of effects-test cases corresponds to the rise of modern communications 
technology. Increasingly, we are seeing disputes that cross state or 
national boundaries, even when the individuals involved remain at 
home.10 In addition, although the stakes at issue in any particular case 
may be fairly limited, the cases in the aggregate raise important issues 
of free speech, commercial development, and protection of intellectual 
property rights.11 
 
 6 See infra Part II; see also Sabados v. Planned Parenthood of Greater Ind., 882 
N.E.2d 121, 127 n.4 (Ill. App. Ct. 2007) (“Calder is limited by its facts and has been 
consistently criticized.”). 
 7 See Clemens, 615 F.3d at 376 (denying jurisdiction); Kauffman Racing, 126 Ohio 
St. 3d 81, 2010-Ohio-2551, 930 N.E.2d 784, at ¶ 1 (upholding jurisdiction). 
 8 See J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2788-90 (2011) 
(plurality opinion) (stating that personal jurisdiction in a commerce case is 
appropriate “only where the defendant can be said to have targeted the forum” and 
concluding that “[r]espondent has not established that J. McIntyre engaged in conduct 
purposefully directed at New Jersey”). 
 9 According to a Westlaw search of cases, there were approximately 94 stream-of-
commerce cases between 1997 and 2000, as compared to 77 effects-test cases. A 
decade later, between 2007 and 2010, the number of stream-of-commerce cases had 
grown to 167 — but the number of effects-test cases had grown to 294. For both time 
periods, I searched (“stream of commerce” w/p “personal jurisdiction”) and (Calder 
w/p “personal jurisdiction”) in the allcases database. Some amount of the increase was 
likely due to improved case coverage in Westlaw, but the relative growth of effect-test 
cases in comparison to stream-of-commerce cases demonstrates the doctrine’s 
increasing relevance. 
 10 See infra Part IV.B.3. 
 11 See infra Part IV.B.2. 
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The time is therefore ripe to revisit the question of effects-test 
jurisdiction and, in particular, to explore the reasons why many courts 
have been so eager to limit its application in the decades since it was 
first adopted. This Article contends that much of the doctrinal 
inconsistency arises from courts’ unexamined views of the underlying 
merits of each case. In effects-test cases, the merits are inextricably 
intertwined with jurisdictional issues and therefore influence — often 
unconsciously — the courts’ decisions on personal jurisdiction.12 
Essentially, when a court accepts the plaintiff’s allegations of 
wrongfulness and harm as true, the court will find jurisdiction.13 
When a court is unwilling to accept the plaintiff’s allegations of 
tortious conduct as true, the court is less likely to find jurisdiction 
appropriate. The burden of proof is thus a critical inquiry in effects-
test cases. 
Although other scholars have noted the “inextricable merits” 
problem in personal jurisdiction generally,14 this Article is the first to 
examine how the inextricable merits problem interacts specifically 
with the effects test. Effects-test cases are different from most other 
personal-jurisdiction cases. Unlike other cases where the merits may 
overlap with the jurisdictional question, the two issues do not merely 
overlap in effects-test cases — instead, they are nearly identical 
inquiries.15 Ultimately, the Article concludes that effects-test cases can 
be harmonized only by explicitly acknowledging the influential role 
played by merits-based assumptions in the past. Going forward, courts 
 
 12 See infra Part II. 
 13 See infra Part II. 
 14 See ROBERT C. CASAD & WILLIAM M. RICHMAN, JURISDICTION IN CIVIL ACTIONS § 4-
2 (3d ed. 1998) (“When a long-arm statute describes the basis for jurisdiction in terms 
of ‘commission of a tortious act’ or ‘entering a contract,’ the fact on which the 
defendant’s susceptibility to jurisdiction depends also may be the ultimate substantive 
issue . . . . The question of whether the defendant can be forced to appear and litigate 
the issue becomes circular: a court cannot decide whether a tort has been committed 
without jurisdiction, but it cannot determine whether jurisdiction exists without 
deciding whether there was a tort.”); Ann Althouse, The Use of Conspiracy Theory to 
Establish In Personam Jurisdiction: A Due Process Analysis, 52 FORDHAM L. REV. 234, 
247 (1983) (analyzing the “inextricable merits” problem in conspiracy-based 
jurisdiction); Kevin M. Clermont, Jurisdictional Fact, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 973, 978 
(2006) (arguing that when jurisdictional facts are intertwined with substantive merits 
questions, the court should require no more than a prima facie showing of 
jurisdiction). 
 15 Because there are no other contacts to analyze in effects-test cases, the 
circularity problem identified by Casad & Richman is not mitigated by supporting 
jurisdictional evidence. See CASAD & RICHMAN, supra note 14, at § 2-5. 
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should require a higher burden of jurisdictional proof in effects-test 
cases, even at the risk of limiting court access for some plaintiffs. 
The Article proceeds as follows: Part I provides a brief background 
on the fundamental principles of personal jurisdiction essential to 
understanding the effects test. Part II then explores the unstated 
influence that merits judgments have on effects-test cases by 
contrasting two paradigm cases, demonstrating how the courts’ 
language choices can reveal hidden assumptions about the cases’ 
underlying merits and can predict the ultimate jurisdictional outcome. 
Part III delves deeper into the standard of jurisdictional proof for 
personal jurisdiction, arguing that courts err when they merely accept 
the plaintiffs’ jurisdictional allegations as true rather than requiring 
proof of jurisdiction. This Part also opposes the lower standard of 
proof advocated by some courts and scholars for resolving 
jurisdictional facts that are closely entwined with the merits of a case. 
Lastly, Part III examines what contacts “count” for effects-test 
jurisdiction, concluding that only wrongful or tortious conduct should 
give rise to effects-test jurisdiction in the absence of any other forum-
state contact. 
This Article concludes that applying the proper burden of proof to 
personal jurisdiction leaves only two choices in most effects-test cases: 
delay the personal jurisdiction determination until trial, thus denying 
the defendant the constitutional due process that the personal 
jurisdiction doctrine was meant to protect, or close the forum to the 
plaintiff and require that suit be filed elsewhere — most likely in the 
defendant’s home forum. Part IV explores the consequences of these 
two options more fully. Ultimately, it concludes that although there 
are significant costs on both sides of the equation, the risks of a 
broader effects test outweigh the costs of a narrower test. It therefore 
recommends that courts abandon the effects test whenever they 
cannot determine before trial whether the defendant has in fact 
engaged in wrongful conduct. In these cases, the court should not rely 
merely on the plaintiff’s allegations of in-state effects; instead, the 
court should look for traditional indicia of purposeful availment of the 
forum state’s benefits and protections. In the absence of such indicia, 
the court should not exercise personal jurisdiction over the defendant. 
I. THE DUE PROCESS PROTECTIONS OF PERSONAL JURISDICTION 
In order to understand the issues arising from the burden of proof in 
effects-test cases, it is necessary to examine some of the basic 
assumptions of the personal jurisdiction doctrine. Because other 
scholars have done an excellent job in tracing the history and 
  
2012] The Inextricable Merits Problem in Personal Jurisdiction 1307 
theoretical implications of the doctrine,16 this Part introduces some of 
the fundamental principles underlying the subsequent jurisdictional 
argument set out in Parts II–IV of this Article. 
A. Protected Interests 
The due process analysis in the determination of personal 
jurisdiction protects the defendant’s due process right in “not being 
subject to the binding judgments of a forum with which [the 
defendant] has established no meaningful ‘contacts, ties, or 
relations.’ ”17 In order to ensure the requisite connection between the 
defendant and the plaintiff’s chosen forum, the Supreme Court has 
distinguished between two types of adjudicatory authority: general 
jurisdiction and specific jurisdiction.18 General jurisdiction applies 
when the defendant’s connections with a forum are “so substantial and 
of such a nature as to justify suit against it on causes of action arising 
from dealings entirely distinct from those activities.” Thus, for 
example, the “paradigm forum” for general jurisdiction is the 
defendant’s home forum.19 Specific jurisdiction, on the other hand, 
applies when the defendant has fewer contacts with the forum, but the 
defendant’s in-forum actions “may be sufficient to render [defendants] 
answerable in that State with respect to those acts, though not with 
respect to matters unrelated to the forum connections.”20 
 
 16 See, e.g., Lea Brilmayer, Related Contacts and Personal Jurisdiction, 101 HARV. L. 
REV. 1444 (1988); Paul D. Carrington & James A. Martin, Substantive Interests and the 
Jurisdiction of State Courts, 66 MICH. L. REV. 227 (1967); Kevin C. McMunigal, Desert, 
Utility, and Minimum Contacts: Toward a Mixed Theory of Personal Jurisdiction, 108 
YALE L.J. 189, 189-90 (1998); Austen L. Parrish, Sovereignty, Not Due Process: Personal 
Jurisdiction over Nonresident Alien Defendants, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1 (2006); 
Wendy Collins Perdue, Personal Jurisdiction and the Beetle in the Box, 32 B.C. L. REV. 
529 (1991); Todd David Peterson, The Timing of Minimum Contacts, 79 GEO. WASH. L. 
REV. 101 (2010); Martin H. Redish, Due Process, Federalism, and Personal Jurisdiction: 
A Theoretical Evaluation, 75 NW. U. L. REV. 1112 (1981); A. Benjamin Spencer, 
Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A Revised Analysis, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 617 (2006); Allan R. 
Stein, Burnham and the Death of Theory in the Law of Personal Jurisdiction, 22 RUTGERS 
L.J. 597 (1991); Allan R. Stein, Styles of Argument and Interstate Federalism in the Law 
of Personal Jurisdiction, 65 TEX. L. REV. 689, 693 (1987); James Weinstein, The Federal 
Common Law Origins of Judicial Jurisdiction: Implications for Modern Doctrine, 90 VA. L. 
REV. 169 (2004). 
 17 Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 471-72 (1985) (quoting Int’l 
Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945)).  
 18 Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2849 
(2011). 
 19 Id. at 2853. 
 20 Id. 
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A plaintiff who wants to sue will thus easily be able to obtain 
personal jurisdiction over the defendant in the defendant’s home 
forum, regardless of whether that forum has any connection to the 
dispute. However, a plaintiff who wants to sue elsewhere, such as in 
the plaintiff’s home forum, will have to establish a connection among 
the defendant, the dispute, and the forum.21 The “minimum contacts” 
jurisprudence that developed to analyze this tripartite connection has 
been described as plagued by ambiguity and incoherence.22 While the 
Supreme Court’s recent jurisprudence has refined the doctrine, it has 
not eliminated the ambiguity inherent in the analysis.23 
The essential question in an analysis of personal jurisdiction “is 
whether a defendant has followed a course of conduct directed at the 
society or economy existing within the jurisdiction of a given 
sovereign, so that the sovereign has the power to subject the defendant 
to judgment concerning that conduct.”24 In a specific-jurisdiction 
analysis, the court must determine whether “the defendant has 
sufficient contacts with the sovereign ‘such that the maintenance of 
the suit does not offend ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial 
justice.’ ”25 Traditionally, courts have interpreted this to mean that the 
plaintiff must first prove that the defendant intentionally engaged in 
acts connected with the target forum, or “minimum contacts”; once 
the plaintiff does so, the burden shifts to the defendant to show some 
reason why jurisdiction would nevertheless be unreasonable in the 
forum.26 
 
 21 Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 204 (1977). Of course this analysis considers 
only the due process protection afforded by personal jurisdiction; there must also be a 
statutory basis as well. See CFA Inst. v. Inst. of Chartered Fin. Analysts of India, 551 
F.3d 285, 292 (4th Cir. 2009) (noting that “the forum state’s long-arm statute must 
authorize the exercise of such personal jurisdiction”). 
 22 McMunigal, supra note 16, at 189 (“Ambiguity and incoherence have plagued 
the minimum contacts test for the more than five decades during which it has served 
as a cornerstone of the Supreme Court’s personal jurisdiction doctrine.”). 
 23 See J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2785 (2011) (plurality 
opinion). But see Allan Ides, A Critical Appraisal of the Supreme Court’s Decision in J. 
Mcintyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro, 45 LOY. L.A. L. REV. (forthcoming 2012) 
(manuscript at 12), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id= 
1938472 (criticizing the Nicastro plurality’s “targeting” approach and noting that the 
Court did not explain what it means by “activity directed at a sovereign”). 
 24 Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2789. 
 25 Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (quoting Milliken v. 
Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)).  
 26 See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 476-77 (1985) (holding that 
once the plaintiff establishes the existence of minimum contacts, the defendant “must 
present a compelling case that the presence of some other considerations would 
render jurisdiction unreasonable”). 
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B. Minimum Contacts, Reasonableness, and the Effects Test 
The contacts supporting jurisdiction cannot be merely fortuitously 
associated with the forum seeking to exercise jurisdiction.27 Instead, 
the “principal inquiry . . . is whether the defendant’s activities manifest 
an intention to submit to the power of a sovereign.”28 The defendant 
generally manifests this intent by “purposefully avai[ling] itself of the 
privilege of conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking 
the benefits and protections of its laws.”29 Thus, relevant “minimum 
contacts” may include in-forum trips, sales, contracts, or other 
voluntary connections with the forum.30 
A more difficult question arises when the defendant does not have 
any of the traditional contacts demonstrating purposeful availment, 
but has allegedly committed a tort or engaged in other conduct that 
that has an effect within the forum. The Restatement (Second) of 
Conflict of Laws suggests that jurisdiction is appropriate in these 
cases: 
A state has power to exercise judicial jurisdiction over an 
individual who causes effects in the state by an act done 
elsewhere with respect to any claim arising from these effects 
unless the nature of the effects and of the individual’s 
relationship to the state make the exercise of such jurisdiction 
unreasonable.31 
In 1984, the Supreme Court adopted the Restatement’s approach, 
known as the “effects test.”32 Thus, in effects-test cases, the minimum 
contacts analysis looks at whether the defendant “purposefully 
directed” conduct at the target forum, rather than whether it 
“purposefully availed” itself of the forum’s benefits and protections.33 
 
 27 Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2801 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 28 Id. at 2783 (plurality opinion). 
 29 Id. at 2787 (quoting Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958)). 
 30 See, e.g., Burger King, 471 U.S. at 462 (concluding that franchise and contract 
activities could give rise to jurisdiction); Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 
320 (1945) (basing jurisdiction on in-state commercial activity). 
 31 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 37 (1988 revision). 
 32 Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 789 (1984). 
 33 See Burger King, 471 U.S. at 472 (stating that jurisdiction is appropriate “if the 
defendant has ‘purposefully directed’ his activities at residents of the forum, and the 
litigation results from alleged injuries that ‘arise out of or relate to’ those activities.”); 
Yahoo! Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme Et L’Antisemitisme, 433 F.3d 1199, 1206 
(9th Cir. 2006) (“In tort cases, we typically inquire whether a defendant “purposefully 
direct[s] his activities” at the forum state, applying an “effects” test that focuses on the 
forum in which the defendant’s actions were felt . . . . By contrast, in contract cases, 
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Regardless of whether a court finds contacts by “direction” or 
“availment,” jurisdiction must still be reasonable. The Supreme Court 
has identified five reasonableness factors that courts must weigh to 
determine whether the situational context would render jurisdiction 
so unfair as to deprive the defendant of due process even when 
minimum contacts are otherwise satisfied.34 These factors are: “the 
burden on the defendant, the interests of the forum State, [] the 
plaintiff’s interest in obtaining relief,” “the interstate judicial system’s 
interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of controversies,” 
and “the shared interest of the several States in furthering fundamental 
substantive social policies.”35 
II. THE HIDDEN MERITS PROBLEM 
While courts have struggled to apply personal jurisdiction principles 
generally, they have had particular difficulty with effects-test cases.36 
As a result, decisions applying the effects test are often conflicting and 
contradictory, and efforts to smooth the inconsistent doctrine have 
been largely ineffective.37 
 
we typically inquire whether a defendant “purposefully avails itself of the privilege of 
conducting activities” . . . focusing on activities such as delivering goods or executing 
a contract.”). 
Combining the concepts of “purposeful direction” and “purposeful availment” can 
lead to awkward constructions implying that tortious activity is itself a privilege. See, 
e.g., Jones v. Dirty World Entm’t Recordings, LLC, 766 F. Supp. 2d 828, 832-33 (E.D. 
Ky. 2011) (“Therefore, the court holds that the record sufficiently shows that Dirty 
World, LLC purposefully availed itself of the privilege of causing a tortious 
consequence in Kentucky by virtue of its web site activities.”). 
 34 Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court of California, 480 U.S. 102, 113 
(1987). 
 35 Id. 
 36 C. Douglas Floyd & Shima Baradaran-Robison, Toward a Unified Test of 
Personal Jurisdiction in an Era of Widely Diffused Wrongs: The Relevance of Purpose and 
Effects, 81 IND. L.J. 601, 618 (2006) (“Particularly where the Calder test has been 
applied, courts have evidenced considerable confusion as to the meaning of its express 
aiming or intentional targeting requirement . . . . These ambiguities have led to 
widespread divergence among the lower courts.”); A. Benjamin Spencer, Terminating 
Calder: “Effects” Based Jurisdiction in the Ninth Circuit After Schwarzenegger v. Fred 
Martin Motor Co., 26 WHITTIER L. REV. 197, 202-03 (2004) (“Although Calder 
contained some clear statements permitting jurisdiction in states where intentional 
torts have effects, the circuit courts were not too enthusiastic about embracing this 
view of the case.”). 
 37 A. Benjamin Spencer, Jurisdiction and the Internet: Returning to Traditional 
Principles to Analyze Network-Mediated Contacts, 2006 U. ILL. L. REV. 71, 101 (2006) 
(noting that especially in cases involving Internet-based contacts, a number of courts 
have “ignor[ed] the targeting of the harmful conduct at issue” in a way that “conflicts 
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Although the legal doctrine in this area may be inconsistent, I 
conclude that effects-test cases actually possess a hidden unifying 
principle: courts’ implicit assessment of the merits underlying 
plaintiffs’ cases. When a court is willing to assume that the plaintiff’s 
allegations are true and that the defendant has engaged in wrongful 
conduct, it is willing to apply the effects test broadly and generally 
finds the defendant to be subject to personal jurisdiction. When a 
court is unwilling to make such assumptions, it generally finds a way 
to distinguish contrary precedent and apply a more narrow 
jurisdictional analysis that avoids finding personal jurisdiction. 
This assumption is not part of the underlying personal jurisdiction 
doctrine. At the jurisdictional stage, the court should not predict the 
ultimate merits of the plaintiff’s causes of action.38 Nor should it weigh 
the social value of the defendant’s allegedly wrongful activity.39 
Nonetheless, it appears that assumptions as to implicit merit and value 
strongly influence the outcomes of these cases.40 
A. The Paradigm Cases 
Two cases illustrate opposite poles of the effects test: Calder, in 
which the Supreme Court first adopted the effects test and found 
jurisdiction, and Young v. New Haven Advocate, in which the Court of 
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit distinguished Calder and denied 
jurisdiction.41 In terms of doctrinally relevant facts, the cases are very 
similar: they both involve defamation suits arising from published 
news articles.42 The doctrinally irrelevant facts, however, are 
substantially different: the plaintiff in Calder was highly sympathetic, 
while the plaintiff in New Haven Advocate was much less so. In 
addition, the defendants’ speech in Calder involved sensationalist 
 
with the standard established in Calder”). 
 38 Clermont, supra note 14, at 1020. 
 39 Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 790 (1984) (noting that weighing the defendants’ 
First Amendment rights at the jurisdictional stage would result in “double-counting” 
those interests). 
 40 An evaluation of the merits acts as a “shadow rule” of jurisdiction in effects-test 
cases. See Robin Effron, The Shadow Rules of Joinder, 100 GEO. L.J. (forthcoming 2012) 
(manuscript at 44) (on file with author) (“The term ‘shadow rules’ is just shorthand 
for categorizing the interpretive differences among courts . . . . It is the element of 
discretion which overlays the spirit of the [federal rules of civil procedure] and the 
operation of specific ones making it difficult to disambiguate ordinary interpretative 
differences from variances stemming from shadow rules.”). 
 41 Calder, 465 U.S. at 783, 789; Young v. New Haven Advocate, 315 F.3d 256, 261 
(4th Cir. 2002). 
 42 Calder, 465 U.S. at 783; Young, 315 F.3d at 258. 
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gossip, while the defendants’ speech in New Haven Advocate involved 
significant governmental policy choices.43 The New Haven court 
explicitly based its holding on a distinction between Internet-mediated 
publication and physical publication; however, observers have found 
that distinction unconvincing.44 When examined in light of the court’s 
language and rhetoric about the parties and conduct at issue, the 
decision makes more sense. Unlike the Supreme Court in Calder, the 
Fourth Circuit was unwilling to assume that the defendants’ conduct 
was wrongful, and it was therefore willing to stretch in order to find a 
doctrinal distinction.45 
The Calder lawsuit arose when Shirley Jones, an actress famous for 
playing wholesome characters,46 sued the less-than-reputable National 
Enquirer47 for publishing an article that portrayed her as a poorly 
functioning alcoholic. The article claimed that Shirley’s husband drove 
her to drink on set, stating that “[s]he start[ed] blurring her lines, and 
by 3 o’clock in the afternoon she[] [was] a crying drunk and they 
ha[d] to stop shooting.”48 Jones sued for libel in her home state of 
California. In addition to suing the Enquirer itself, she also named 
both the writer and editor of the article as individual defendants.49 
The Enquirer did not contest personal jurisdiction in California, nor 
could it reasonably do so — it admittedly sold numerous copies of the 
publication there, which sufficed as a minimum contact with the 
forum.50 The writer and editor, however, did contest personal 
jurisdiction.51 They both worked in Florida, and both asserted that 
their only travel to California had been unrelated to their work on the 
 
 43 Calder, 465 U.S. at 784; Young, 315 F.3d at 259. 
 44 Spencer, supra note 37, at 101-02. 
 45 See Young, 315 F.3d at 262-63. 
 46 See, e.g., Susan King, The Other Side of Mrs. Partridge, L.A. TIMES, May 15, 2009 
(noting that “Shirley Jones does wholesome as well as anybody in the business (with 
the possible exception of Doris Day)”). Jones is perhaps best known for her role as 
“the loving mom” in the Partridge Family sitcom. Id. 
 47 At the time this case arose, the paper was known primarily as “a disreputable 
scandal sheet and all-around guilty pleasure, filled with an enthusiastic combination 
of the lurid, the tawdry and the wholly preposterous.” Paul Farhi, Going Respectable?, 
AM. JOURNALISM REV., June–July 2010, at ¶ 4. In recent years, however, the publication 
has the first to break major news stories, such as Tiger Woods’s infidelity and John 
Edwards’s affair with a campaign staffer. Id. 
 48 See John South, Husband’s Bizarre Behavior Is Driving Shirley Jones to Drink, 
NAT’L ENQUIRER, Oct. 9, 1979, available at 1982 U.S. Briefs 1401, at *8-9. 
 49 Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 785-86 (1984). 
 50 Id. at 788-90. 
 51 Id. 
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story.52 The Court agreed that the publication’s circulation in 
California could not be imputed to its employees, so the Enquirer’s 
California sales were not counted as minimum contacts in the case 
against the individual defendants.53 Beyond the pair’s unrelated trips to 
California, the writer’s phone calls to California in researching the 
story, and the story itself, the Court concluded that there were “no 
other relevant contacts with California.”54 
In spite of the paucity of the individual defendants’ contacts, the 
Court nonetheless concluded that both of them were subject to 
personal jurisdiction in California.55 The Court found that the 
purposeful availment requirement had been satisfied because the 
editor and writer had “expressly aimed” and “targeted” their actions at 
the forum state.56 Although the defendants had attempted to avoid 
jurisdiction by analogizing their work on the magazine to the position 
of “a welder employed in Florida who works on a boiler which 
subsequently explodes in California,” the Court disagreed that the 
situations were comparable.57 It distinguished between the welder’s 
“mere untargeted negligence” and the writer and editor’s “intentional, 
and allegedly tortious, actions” that were “expressly aimed” at the 
forum state.58 
Interestingly, even though there was not yet a judicial determination 
of the falsity at this stage in the litigation, the Court refused to give 
weight to First Amendment concerns. Although the defendants had 
asked the Court to weigh speech protection in its determination, the 
Court flatly “reject[ed] the suggestion that First Amendment concerns 
enter into the jurisdictional analysis.”59 It concluded that such 
concerns would “needlessly complicate an already imprecise 
inquiry.”60 In addition, the Court implied that the relevant First 
Amendment rights were already amply protected by substantive 
 
 52 Id. at 785 n.4. Although there was some dispute about whether the author had 
traveled to California to conduct research for the story, he maintained that he relied 
only “on phone calls to sources in California for the information contained in the 
article.” Id. at 786. The Supreme Court found it “unnecessary to consider the 
contention.” Id. 
 53 Id. at 789. 
 54 Id. at 786. 
 55 Id. at 791. 
 56 Id. at 789. 
 57 Id. (citing Buckeye Boiler Co. v. Superior Court, 458 P.2d 57 (Cal. 1969) and 
Gray v. Am. Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 176 N.E.2d 761 (Ill. 1961)). 
 58 Id. at 789. 
 59 Id. at 790. 
 60 Id. 
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defamation law, noting that “the potential chill on protected First 
Amendment activity stemming from libel and defamation actions is 
already taken into account in the constitutional limitations on the 
substantive law governing such suits.”61 It concluded that weighing 
speech protection at the jurisdictional stage “would be a form of 
double counting.”62 
In Young v. New Haven Advocate, the Fourth Circuit was also faced 
with a defamation claim, but one with a far less sympathetic plaintiff 
and with more important speech at issue. The case arose when a 
Virginia prison warden, Stanley Young, sued three Connecticut 
newspapers and related defendants for libel. The State of Connecticut 
had run low on prison space and had begun contracting with the State 
of Virginia to house Connecticut prisoners.63 Connecticut newspapers 
ran stories questioning the wisdom of this policy; these stories 
included quotes from state politicians that were sharply critical of 
Young and his collection of Civil War prints and Confederate 
memorabilia in particular. One article stated that “[t]he Civil War 
scenes in Young’s office — under printed titles that say ‘Our Heroes’ 
— set an ominous, racist tone for the current group of 399 
Connecticut inmates, who are predominantly black and Hispanic.”64 
Another article quoted a state senator: “If you’d been in that office . . . 
you’d have thought the South won the Civil War. The paraphernalia 
should not be on display outside the warden’s home.”65 A third article 
quoted a state representative: “It’s a part of a mindset that is not 
understood in Connecticut and is easily misinterpreted. If you’re a 
Connecticut person, especially African-American, you don’t see the 
difference between a Confederate flag and a white sheet.”66 
Warden Young objected to these statements and others critical of his 
work, arguing that the statements “were meant and intended to 
convey, and did convey, to the community at large, the impression 
that Warden Stanley Young is a racist and a member of the Ku Klux 
Klan,” and that they implied he was “unsuited, unfit, and without 
ability or capacity to hold the position of Warden of a prison.”67 Young 
did not specifically deny maintaining a collection of Confederate 
 
 61 Id.  
 62 Id. 
 63 Complaint at Count III, ¶ 4, Young v. New Haven Advocate, 184 F. Supp. 2d 
498 (W.D. Va. 2000) (No. 2:00CV00086). 
 64 Id. 
 65 Id. 
 66 Id. 
 67 Id. 
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memorabilia. Nonetheless, he asserted that he had “always enjoyed a 
good reputation for uprightness of character, fairness to others, 
truthfulness and competence in his ability to administer prisons as 
well as his standing in his profession in the correctional community,” 
and that this good reputation was harmed by the allegedly defamatory 
statements.68 
Both the trial court and the appellate court focused on the Internet-
based nature of the contacts in their jurisdictional analyses. The 
newspapers argued that they did nothing to target a Virginian 
readership; although the articles were posted on the papers’ websites, 
all on-line advertising was local, and the stories were targeted at a 
Connecticut audience.69 Young, on the other hand, argued that placing 
the articles on the website made them accessible to Virginian friends 
and colleagues, thus harming his reputation where he lived and 
worked.70 
The Fourth Circuit was persuaded by the newspapers’ arguments 
and distinguished the case from Calder on the basis of the Internet 
contacts. It held that “application of Calder in the Internet context 
requires proof that the out-of-state defendant’s Internet activity is 
expressly targeted at or directed to the forum state.”71 Because the 
newspapers were not attempting to reach a Virginian readership, the 
court concluded that there was no such express targeting.72 
As Professor Spencer points out, this result is inconsistent with the 
Supreme Court’s test in Calder.73 The question in Calder was not 
whether the publication itself targeted a California readership — there 
was no question that it did and, therefore, no question that there was 
jurisdiction over the National Enquirer.74 But the Court in Calder had 
also accepted the defendant writer’s and editor’s contentions that they 
had no control over where the paper was sold or read, and that the 
newspaper’s circulation could not be imputed to them as contacts.75 
Thus, the Calder decision rested on the idea that the mere writing and 
 
 68 Id. 
 69 Young v. New Haven Advocate, 315 F.3d 256, 259-60 (4th Cir. 2002). 
 70 Id. at 262-63. 
 71 Id. 
 72 Id. at 264 (“The facts in this case establish that the newspapers’ websites, as well 
as the articles in question, were aimed at a Connecticut audience. The newspapers did 
not post materials on the Internet with the manifest intent of targeting Virginia 
readers.”). 
 73 Spencer, supra note 37, at 101. 
 74 Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 790 (1984). 
 75 Id. (“Petitioners are correct that their contacts with California are not to be 
judged according to their employer’s activities there.”). 
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editing of a defamatory article was itself sufficient to support 
jurisdiction in the forum where the plaintiff lived, worked, and 
suffered reputational harm.76 The circulation of the publication in 
California was not entirely irrelevant because the California readership 
caused some of the harm to Jones’s reputation. Nonetheless, for 
purposes of jurisdiction, the Court did not require that the editor or 
writer have any control over circulation or intent to circulate in the 
relevant forum — writing and editing the defamatory publication was 
enough to prove that they “targeted” the forum, even when its 
ultimate circulation was out of their control.77 
The court in New Haven Advocate essentially applied the commercial 
activity analysis from the minimum contacts test in place of the Calder 
effects test. If the newspapers had indeed sought to target a Virginia 
readership, there would be jurisdiction because the defendants were 
“seek[ing] to serve” the market.78 Jurisdiction under such 
circumstances is so well settled that the National Enquirer itself did not 
contest jurisdiction; it clearly served the California market.79 The 
effects test is needed only when there is no intent to serve a state’s 
market. Even accepting the defendants’ contention that putting the 
article on the Internet should not be viewed as intent to distribute the 
publication to a Virginia audience, no such intent is needed under 
Calder. Intent to defame is sufficient to find jurisdiction under the 
effects test; intent to distribute to an in-state readership is 
unnecessary.80 
 
 76 Id. at 789-90 (“Petitioner South wrote and petitioner Calder edited an article 
that they knew would have a potentially devastating impact upon respondent. And 
they knew that the brunt of that injury would be felt by respondent in the State in 
which she lives and works and in which the National Enquirer has its largest 
circulation.”). 
 77 Id. at 789 (noting the defendants’ argument that they “have no direct economic 
stake in their employer’s sales in a distant State,” and are not “able to control their 
employer’s marketing activity,” but rejecting these arguments because “their 
intentional, and allegedly tortious, actions were expressly aimed at California”). 
 78 J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2788 (2011) (plurality 
opinion) (“[A] defendant may in an appropriate case be subject to jurisdiction without 
entering the forum — itself an unexceptional proposition — as where manufacturers 
or distributors ‘seek to serve’ a given State’s market.”). 
 79 This is a point that is frequently misunderstood by courts attempting to 
distinguish Calder. See, e.g., Indianapolis Colts, Inc. v. Metro. Balt. Football Club Ltd., 
34 F.3d 410, 412 (7th Cir. 1994) (“The defendant had also ‘entered’ the state in some 
fashion, as by the sale (in Calder) of the magazine containing the defamatory 
material.”). Of course the writer and editor were the only defendants in Calder to 
contest personal jurisdiction, and the Supreme Court explicitly chose not to impute 
the magazine sales to the individual defendants. Calder, 465 U.S. at 783. 
 80 Spencer, supra note 37, at 101-02 (“Any person who targets wrongdoing at a 
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Other scholars have convincingly argued why the Internet-based 
nature of the publication should not have influenced the outcome of 
New Haven Advocate;81 the publication medium cannot be dispositive 
when it is the defamatory statement itself, as opposed to its in-state 
circulation, that gives rise to jurisdiction.82 But why, then, was the 
Fourth Circuit willing to accede to the defendants’ unconvincing 
distinction between Internet-based publication and paper-based 
publication?83 And why, in other cases, have many other courts 
attempted to impose a narrower reading of the Calder effects test?84 
The two courts’ underlying views of the merits may better explain 
the different outcomes in Calder and New Haven Advocate. At least for 
purposes of determining personal jurisdiction, the Supreme Court in 
Calder appeared to accept the truth of the plaintiff’s allegations as 
pleaded, both as to the falsity of the defendants’ statements and the 
defendants’ wrongful intent in making them, and as to the harm that 
the plaintiff suffered as a result of those statements.85 The Court’s 
language telegraphs its assumption that the defendants did in fact 
 
victim found residing within a particular state can anticipate having to answer for that 
wrongdoing in the courts of that state. That is the essential holding and logic of 
Calder . . . . Courts should not evaluate whether a wrongdoer has targeted the victim’s 
fellow state residents or the State itself because Calder accords such considerations 
little relevance . . . . What should be and is relevant under Calder is that the victim 
was the target of the wrongdoing and whether that victim is a resident of the forum 
State.”). 
 81 Id. (summarizing critiques). 
 82 Id. at 103 (“[C]ourts are evaluating who the defendant’s target “audience” is 
rather than who the victim of the allegedly intentionally tortious conduct is. But as the 
Calder Court made clear, it is the targeting of wrongdoing, not of the medium of its 
transmission, that matters.”). 
 83 In fact, one of the newspaper defendants also distributed several paper copies to 
eight subscribers in the State of Virginia. In order to maintain the Internet/paper 
distinction, however, the Fourth Circuit avoided consideration of this physical 
circulation by concluding that the plaintiff had not relied on those contacts. Young v. 
New Haven Advocate, 315 F.3d 256, 261 (4th Cir. 2002) (“[W]e can put aside the few 
Virginia contacts that are not Internet based because Warden Young does not rely on 
them.”). 
 84 See Griffis v. Luban, 646 N.W.2d 527, 533 (Minn. 2002) (“Courts have come to 
varying conclusions about how broadly the ‘effects test’ approved in Calder can be 
applied to find jurisdiction. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals has construed 
Calder very broadly . . . . However, the other federal courts of appeals that have 
considered the issue have rejected this expansive view that Calder supports specific 
jurisdiction in a forum state merely because the harmful effects of an intentional tort 
committed in another jurisdiction are primarily felt in the forum.”). 
 85 Although the court would be correct to defer to the plaintiff’s factual allegations 
in ruling on a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, this standard is 
inappropriate for jurisdictional rulings. See infra Part III.A.1.  
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engage in defamation. This assumption may well be factually correct; 
after all, shortly after the jurisdictional ruling, the plaintiff accepted a 
confidential monetary settlement in exchange for dropping her $20 
million claim.86 But, true or not, at this stage of the litigation, the 
wrongfulness of the conduct was still an assumption — the case had 
not yet been litigated on the merits. At trial, the plaintiff would bear 
the burden of proving that the defendants’ statements were in fact 
false; if the plaintiff could not show falsity, then the defendants’ 
conduct in writing the story would not have been wrongful, regardless 
of how unflattering the story might have been.87 
The Court explicitly recognized that the allegations were not yet 
proven, referring in several instances to the defendants “alleged” 
wrongdoing.88 In spite of this acknowledgment, however, the Court 
used language strongly critical of the individual defendants. The Court 
wrote that “Petitioner South wrote and Petitioner Calder edited an 
article that they knew would have a potentially devastating impact on 
respondent,” that “they knew that the brunt of the injury would be felt 
by respondent in the State in which she lives and works,” and that 
they were “primary participants in an alleged wrongdoing 
intentionally directed at a California resident.”89 The Court implied 
that the defendants’ mental state encompassed both knowledge and 
specific intent; not only did the defendants “kn[o]w that the brunt of 
 
 86 See Brief for Appellants at 12, Calder v. Jones, No. 82-1401 (June 17, 1983), 
1982 U.S. Briefs 1401 (noting that Jones sought $10 million in compensatory damages 
as well as $10 million in punitive damages); Aljean Harmetz, National Enquirer Agrees 
to Settle With Shirley Jones in Libel Suit, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 27, 1984, at A17. 
 87 Phila. Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 776 (1986) (“We believe that 
the common law’s rule on falsity — that the defendant must bear the burden of 
proving truth — must similarly fall here to a constitutional requirement that the 
plaintiff bear the burden of showing falsity, as well as fault, before recovering 
damages.”); see also Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 341 (1974) (“The 
legitimate state interest underlying the law of libel is the compensation of individuals 
for the harm inflicted on them by defamatory falsehood.”). Interestingly, Shirley 
Jones’s husband, Marty Ingels, dropped his defamation claim while her claim was still 
pending, before the case was heard by the Supreme Court. See Transcript of Oral 
Argument at 2, Calder v. Jones, 82-1401 (Nov. 8, 1983), 1983 U.S. Trans. LEXIS 38. 
The article had also made unflattering statements about Ingels, claiming that he owes 
money that he “never” pays back and he “has one of the most notorious casting 
couches in all of Hollywood.” South, supra note 48. 
 88 Calder, 465 U.S. at 783, 788, 790 (referring to “[t]he allegedly libelous story,” 
the defendants’ ”allegedly tortious” actions, and the defendants’ ”participation in an 
alleged wrongdoing”). 
 89 Id. at 789-90. 
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the injury” would be felt in California, but their conduct was 
“calculated to cause injury” in California.90 
In contrast to the critical language the Court used to describe the 
defendants’ actions, the language it used to describe the plaintiff’s 
claim expressed much more sympathy. The Court stated that the 
article “impugned [her] professionalism,” by alleging that she drank at 
work.91 The Court concluded that her “emotional distress” and “injury 
to her professional reputation” should be actionable in California.92 
The Fourth Circuit in New Haven Advocate made no such 
assumption of the defendants’ wrongdoing; in general, the court was 
much more circumspect in demonstrating its allegiance to either side’s 
version of the facts. Nevertheless, the court’s articulation of the facts of 
the case suggests that the court was, at best, skeptical of the plaintiff’s 
likelihood of success. Where the Supreme Court in Calder accused the 
defendants of “impugn[ing] the [plaintiff’s] professionalism,” the 
Fourth Circuit more gently described the defendants’ conduct in New 
Haven Advocate as “discuss[ing] the allegedly harsh conditions at the 
Virginia prison,” “express[ing] concern” about the display of 
Confederate memorabilia, and “questioning the practice” of sending 
Connecticut prisoners to Virginia.93 The much gentler rhetoric 
suggests that the court did not believe that the defendants had 
published libelous falsehoods or intentionally sought to harm Young’s 
reputation. 
Furthermore, although Calder flatly prohibited consideration of 
First Amendment principles at the jurisdictional stage, the Fourth 
Circuit’s language in New Haven Advocate emphasized the importance 
of the speech at issue. The court noted that Connecticut’s decision to 
transfer inmates to Virginia was a policy that “provoked considerable 
public debate” both among the public and state legislators, and that 
the policy was controversial enough that Connecticut citizens engaged 
in “demonstrations against it at the state capitol in Hartford.”94 In 
concluding that “Connecticut, not Virginia, was the focal point of the 
articles,” the court emphasized the importance of the speech at issue: 
“The articles reported on and encouraged a public debate in 
Connecticut about whether the transfer policy was sound or practical 
for that state and its citizens.”95 Thus, although the court did not 
 
 90 Id. at 789, 791. 
 91 Id. at 788 n.9. 
 92 Id. at 789. 
 93 Id. at 788; Young v. New Haven Advocate, 315 F. 3d 256, 259 (4th Cir. 2002). 
 94 Young, 315 F.3d at 259. 
 95 Id. at 263-64. 
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explicitly take First Amendment issues into account at the 
jurisdictional stage, it nonetheless characterized the facts of the case in 
a way that emphasized the importance of the speech at issue. Because 
the court did not accept the plaintiff’s characterization of the 
defendants’ speech as wrongful or tortious, it did not find that the 
speech was calculated to cause injury, much less to cause injury in 
Virginia. 
B. Difficult Cases: The Merits at Equipoise 
The differing outcomes in Calder and New Haven Advocate, while 
inconsistent, may result in a type of rough justice.96 While the courts’ 
assumptions of the merits of those cases may have unwittingly 
influenced the jurisdictional outcome, those assumptions were 
probably correct. An actress who loses work because of false 
accusations of alcohol abuse likely has a strong defamation claim; a 
prison official who keeps Confederate memorabilia in his office and 
then complains that publications criticizing this practice “imply that 
he ‘is a racist who advocates racism’ ” likely has a much weaker 
claim.97 In a number of the cases distinguishing Calder, the plaintiffs’ 
claims were similarly weak.98 
In many cases, however, the strength of the plaintiff’s claim is much 
less clear at the pretrial stage. Neither the plaintiff nor the defendant 
may be more sympathetic than the other, and the merits of the claim 
may be murky even after pretrial evidentiary development. In these 
cases, the courts’ opinions have been even more contradictory and 
 
 96 Michael E. Solimine, The Quiet Revolution in Personal Jurisdiction, 73 TUL. L. 
REV. 1, 67 n.117 (1998) (“If a plaintiff comes to court with what appears to be a 
meritorious claim, the trial judge may be inclined to deny a motion to dismiss for lack 
of personal jurisdiction, rather than force the plaintiff to endure the delay inherent in 
bringing suit in another forum. Likewise, if the plaintiff’s suit appears to lack merit, 
the trial judge may be inclined to take advantage of an opportunity to quickly dismiss 
the case on jurisdictional grounds.”). 
 97 Young, 315 F.3d at 259; see Meiring de Villiers, Substantial Truth in Defamation 
Law, 32 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 91, 98 (2008) (“The truth or falsity of an alleged 
defamatory statement and the degree of fault exhibited by the defendant clearly play a 
prominent role in a defamation action.”). 
 98 See, e.g., Marten v. Godwin, 499 F.3d 290, 293 (3d Cir. 2007) (holding that a 
Pennsylvania court lacked personal jurisdiction over a defamation and retaliation 
claim brought by a student accused of plagiarism and expelled from an online degree 
program); Griffis v. Luban, 646 N.W.2d 527, 536 (Minn. 2002) (holding that Alabama 
lacked jurisdiction over a defamation claim that arose when the out-of-state defendant 
wrote on an Internet forum that the Alabama plaintiff lacked academic credentials and 
got her archeology degree from a “box of Cracker Jacks,” noting that there was no 
record evidence of actual harm to the plaintiff’s reputation). 
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unpredictable than in more one-sided cases, but each decision still 
largely depends on whether the court is willing to accept as true the 
plaintiff’s allegations about the underlying claim. 
Online consumer criticism provides fertile ground for cases whose 
merits are less than clear.99 The Supreme Court recently denied a 
petition for certiorari in one such case — Kauffman Racing Equipment, 
L.L.C. v. Roberts.100 The case arose when Kauffman Racing Equipment, 
an Ohio business, sold an engine block to Scott Roberts, a resident of 
Virginia.101 Roberts believed the product to be defective.102 Kauffman 
Racing agreed to refund his money if the company could verify that 
the product was defective. However, after inspection, the company 
concluded that any defect arose from modifications that Roberts made 
to the block after receiving it.103 
Roberts criticized both the product and the seller on automotive 
websites, including eBay Motors, where the seller engaged in online 
sales.104 Roberts’s comments called the block “junk,” called the owner 
of Kauffman Racing “less than honorable,” and wrote that he was 
trying to get his message out “to help other potential victims.”105 
Unsurprisingly, Kauffman Racing saw the issue differently. The 
company asserted that Roberts’s statements were false and defamatory, 
and that Roberts was wrongfully attempting to cause the company to 
lose business.106 Kauffman Racing sued Roberts in Ohio state court 
both for defamation and for intentional interference with contracts 
and business relationships.107 
The Ohio courts found the case to be a difficult one. The lower 
courts split on the question of personal jurisdiction, with the trial 
court dismissing the case and the intermediate court reinstating it.108 
The Ohio Supreme Court affirmed in a split decision, but the majority 
and dissenting justices struggled with the relationship between 
 
 99 See, e.g., BroadVoice, Inc. v. TP Innovations LLC, 733 F. Supp. 2d 219 (D. 
Mass. 2010) (ruling on a motion to dismiss); Kauffman Racing Equip., L.L.C. v. 
Roberts, 126 Ohio St. 3d 81, 2010-Ohio-2551, 930 N.E.2d 784, at ¶ 1, cert. denied, 131 
S. Ct. 3089 (2011) (same). 
 100 131 S. Ct. 3089 (2011). 
 101 Kauffman Racing, 126 Ohio St. 3d 81, 2010-Ohio-2551, 930 N.E.2d 784, at ¶ 1. 
 102 Id. 
 103 Id. at 787-88. 
 104 Id. at 788. 
 105 Id.  
 106 Id. at 789. 
 107 Id. 
 108 Id. 
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jurisdiction and merits.109 As in Calder, the majority accepted the 
plaintiff’s factual allegations, which led to a finding of jurisdiction: 
“When viewed in a light most favorable to [Kauffman Racing], the 
evidence shows that Roberts intentionally and tortiously sought to 
harm [Kauffman Racing’s] reputation and negatively affect its 
contracts and business relationships.”110 The dissenting justices were 
less willing to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the 
plaintiff.111 While the dissent did not explicitly take issue with the 
jurisdictional burden of proof, they nonetheless refused to infer 
wrongfulness: 
While it is evident from Roberts’s Internet posts that he sought 
to discourage others from purchasing KRE’s products, any 
individual who posts a negative review of a product or service 
in a public forum arguably seeks the same objective. 
Subjecting all individuals to suit in Ohio who post Internet 
reviews — no matter how scathing — of purchases made from 
Ohio companies does not comport with the due process 
notions of “fair play and substantial justice.”112 
The burden of proof on the wrongfulness of the defendant’s conduct 
therefore appears to be the determinative issue in the case and 
highlights a more general trend. When the court views the evidence in 
the light most favorable to the plaintiff, it must assume that the 
defendant was indeed making false statements in an effort to harm the 
plaintiff, and under Calder jurisdiction is therefore appropriate based 
on the defendant’s intent to harm a known resident of Ohio.113 On the 
other hand, when the court is unwilling to assume harmful intent, 
there is no “expressly aimed” tort on which to base personal 
jurisdiction.114 And at least at the pretrial stage, there is little evidence 
by which to predict whether the defendant’s conduct was wrongful. 
Without knowing whether the product was actually defective, it is 
difficult to guess whether the defendant wrongfully trying to harm the 
reputation of an innocent seller or reasonably trying to warn 
consumers of an unscrupulous one. 
 
 109 Id. at 797-99. 
 110 Id. at 796. 
 111 Id. at 799 (O’Donnell, J., dissenting). 
 112 Id.  
 113 See id. at 796 (majority opinion); supra Part II.A. 
 114 Kauffman Racing, 126 Ohio St. 3d 81, 2010-Ohio-2551, 930 N.E.2d 784, at ¶ 55. 
(quoting Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 789-90 (1984)). 
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Outside the defamation context, intertwined problems of merits and 
jurisdiction can also make it difficult to determine jurisdiction in close 
cases. One recent case, Dudnikov v. Chalk & Vermilion Fine Arts, 
Inc.,115 involved an intellectual property dispute. Plaintiffs Karen 
Dudnikov and Michael Meadors made a living selling printed fabric on 
eBay.116 One set of prints resembled artwork by the artist Erté. 
However, as the court noted, “While Erté’s images depict elegant 
women walking aquiline dogs, plaintiffs’ prints portray Betty Boop 
next to her aptly named canine companion, Pudgy.”117 Chalk & 
Vermilion Fine Arts, the American agent for the British copyright 
holder of the original Erté images, and the copyright holder itself, all 
believed that the fabric infringed on their copyrights.118 Dudnikov and 
Meadors disagreed. Chalk and Vermilion first filed a notice of claimed 
infringement with eBay, which Dudnikov and Meadors contested. 
SevenArts, the British copyright holder, then sent an email to 
Dudnikov announcing an intent to file suit for copyright 
infringement.119 Dudnikov and Meadors preempted the threatened suit 
by filing, pro se, an action in their home state of Colorado seeking a 
declaratory judgment that their fabric did not infringe the Erté 
copyright.120 Both SevenArts and Chalk & Vermilion contested 
personal jurisdiction. The district court dismissed the case, but the 
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed and reinstated the 
case.121 
Dudnikov and Meadors relied on the Calder effects test to argue in 
favor of jurisdiction, claiming that defendants’ efforts to shut down 
their auction, although initiated in the defendants’ home jurisdiction 
and communicated to eBay in California, were targeted to interfere 
with their business in Colorado.122 The defendants, on the other hand, 
argued that their actions were not wrongful and that they were merely 
“vindicating their putative intellectual property rights.”123 
The dispute created a difficult question for the court. It had no 
doubt that the defendant intended to have an impact in the state of 
 
 115 514 F.3d 1063 (10th Cir. 2008). 
 116 Id. at 1067. 
 117 Id. 
 118 Id. 
 119 Id. 
 120 Id. 
 121 Id. at 1067-68. 
 122 Id. 
 123 Id. at 1072. 
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Colorado.124 It likened the defendant’s conduct to “a bank shot in 
basketball” in which “[a] player who shoots the ball off of the 
backboard intends to hit the backboard, but he does so in the service 
of his further intention of putting the ball into the basket.”125 Here, the 
court concluded, because Chalk & Vermilion sent the notice of 
claimed infringement to California with the intent of cancelling the 
auction in Colorado, their “ ‘express aim’ thus can be said to have 
reached into Colorado in much the same way that a basketball player’s 
express aim in shooting off of the backboard is not simply to hit the 
backboard, but to make a basket.”126 
The more difficult determination, however, was the import of the 
defendants’ conduct: was it wrongful, and did it even need to be 
wrongful to support jurisdiction? Or could the Calder effects test 
support jurisdiction based on nonwrongful conduct directed at the 
forum? The court avoided what it characterized as a “thicket” by 
accepting the plaintiff’s allegation of wrongfulness as true.127 By 
“crediting the complaint as true,” as the court believed it “must” at the 
jurisdictional stage, the court was able to adopt “an inference that 
defendants tortiously interfered with plaintiffs’ business” sufficient to 
support effects-test jurisdiction.128 
The merits of the parties’ contentions in Kauffman Racing and 
Dudnikov are fairly balanced, and in both cases the courts could find 
effects-test jurisdiction only by assuming the truth of plaintiffs’ 
allegations of wrongfulness and harm. In similar cases, however, 
courts have come to the opposite conclusion by refusing to take such 
allegations as true. 
One such case, BroadVoice, Inc. v. TP Innovations LLC,129 presents a 
number of close parallels to Kauffman Racing; like the earlier action, it is 
a defamation case involving online consumer criticism. Michael Bednar, 
doing business as TP Innovations LLC, used BroadVoice for business 
telephone service.130 After he became dissatisfied with the service, he 
purchased the domain name “www.bewareofbroadvoice.com” and 
posted various criticisms of the company.131 He accused the company of 
violating numerous laws, referred to it as “The Internet Telephone 
 
 124 Id. at 1075. 
 125 Id. 
 126 Id. 
 127 Id. at 1073. 
 128 Id. 
 129 733 F. Supp. 2d 219 (D. Mass. 2010). 
 130 Id. at 222. 
 131 Id. 
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Service From Hell,” and “encouraged BroadVoice ‘victims’ to file 
complaints” with various state and federal agencies.132 His website 
provided links to assist other customers in contacting those agencies.133 
The company and two of its officers filed suit for defamation, 
intentional infliction of emotional distress, and business disparagement 
in the company’s home state of Massachusetts.134 Interestingly, when 
the court cited the standard of review, it concluded that it “must take 
the jurisdictional facts affirmatively alleged by the plaintiff as true and 
construe all ‘disputed facts in the light most hospitable to [the] 
plaintiff.’ ”135 Nevertheless, it avoided making a finding of jurisdiction 
by concluding that (1) the plaintiffs did not formally allege “that Bednar 
intended that ‘the brunt of the harm’ be felt in Massachusetts,” and (2) 
that the website was not targeted at a Massachusetts readership more 
than any other forum.136 
Neither distinction was fully convincing. The plaintiffs had 
identified Calder as a “directly analogous” case, and Calder 
acknowledges that the brunt of the harm will be felt where a 
defamation plaintiff “lives and works.”137 Furthermore, as noted above, 
Calder did not require the individual defendants to target a particular 
readership; it was the harm from the intentional tort that was targeted 
at the forum, not the communication itself.138 If the defendant had 
particularly targeted a Massachusetts readership, there likely would 
have been personal jurisdiction based on traditional principles of 
purposeful availment and seeking to serve the state market — there 
would have been no need to rely on the effects test.139 Therefore, even 
though the court claimed to take the plaintiff’s allegations as true, it 
did not assume for jurisdictional purposes that the defendant 
intentionally engaged in wrongful conduct harmful to the plaintiff, but 
instead looked for traditional indicia of purposeful availment. 
Another case, Radio Systems Corp. v. Accession, Inc.,140 decided by 
the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, presents parallels to 
Dudnikov. It also was an intellectual property case in which the 
plaintiff sought a declaratory judgment, although this case arose out of 
 
 132 Id. 
 133 Id. 
 134 Id. 
 135 Id. at 223. 
 136 Id. 
 137 Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 784 (1984). 
 138 See supra Part I.A. 
 139 See supra notes 78-80. 
 140 638 F.3d 785, 789 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 
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competing patent claims.141 The defendant, Accession, believed that a 
patent application filed by Radio Systems infringed on an earlier 
Accession patent.142 Accession contacted the Patent and Trademark 
Office (“PTO”) in order to bring its earlier patent to the office’s 
attention in connection with Radio Systems’ patent application.143 The 
PTO then withdrew the “notice of allowance” it had previously issued, 
thus leaving room for the patent to be challenged.144 Radio Systems 
sued Accession in Tennessee, seeking a declaration of 
noninfringement and of invalidity of Accession’s earlier patent.145 
Unlike the Tenth Circuit in Dudnikov, the Federal Circuit was 
unwilling to assume that Accession was wrongfully interfering with 
Radio Systems’ business.146 Instead, the court concluded that 
Accession’s contacts with the PTO were directed at Virginia, where the 
PTO office was located, rather than Tennessee, where Radio Systems 
was headquartered.147 In reaching that conclusion, the court 
characterized Accession’s efforts as “enforcement activities”;148 unlike 
the Dudnikov court, it did not characterize the conduct as necessarily 
tortious or wrongful. 
These different outcomes in substantially similar cases suggest that a 
clearer standard of proof is needed for effects-test cases. At the outer 
limits, the hidden influence of the merits on jurisdictional decisions 
may not have a significant influence on how cases are ultimately 
resolved; it merely allows weaker cases to be dismissed earlier. In cases 
where the merits are at equipoise, however, this influence results in 
significant unpredictability and doctrinal confusion. When courts rely 
on assumptions about the merits of the claim in order to determine 
jurisdiction, they reach unpredictable and conflicting jurisdictional 
determinations in cases where the claims appear evenly balanced. 
III. REFRAMING THE JURISDICTIONAL STANDARD OF PROOF 
Part II described the confusion and inconsistency in effects-test 
cases and argued that there is a hidden factor influencing how the 
decisions come out: when courts accept the plaintiff’s allegations of 
 
 141 Id.  
 142 Id. at 788. 
 143 Id. 
 144 Id. 
 145 Radio Sys. Corp. v. Accession, Inc., No. 3:09-CV-481, 2010 WL 2103443, at *2 
(E.D. Tenn. May 21, 2010). 
 146 Radio Sys. Corp., 638 F.3d at 792. 
 147 See id. 
 148 See id. 
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wrongfulness and harm as true, the court will find jurisdiction. The 
burden of proof is therefore a critical inquiry in effects-test cases. 
This Part examines the jurisdictional burden of proof in greater 
depth. First, it focuses on the quantum of proof necessary for effects-
test personal jurisdiction, analyzing what standard (or standards) of 
proof courts are currently applying, the costs and benefits of possible 
standards, and the assumptions a court may appropriately make at this 
stage. Second, it examines what types of contacts should “count” for 
effects-test jurisdiction. Specifically, it questions whether the 
defendant’s actions must be wrongful and tortious, or whether it is 
enough that the defendant’s actions merely have an intentional effect 
on the forum. 
A. The Burden of Proof for Jurisdictional Facts 
Despite the importance of the burden of proof, court opinions in 
this area are especially confused and fragmented. There are several 
reasons for this doctrinal incoherence. First, and perhaps most 
importantly, this is an issue that has received little attention from 
litigants, courts, or scholars.149 As a result, few litigants raise the issue 
and few court decisions explicitly examine it — even the Supreme 
Court in Calder failed to explicitly identify the jurisdictional standard 
of proof, though it relied implicitly on the defendants’ ”alleged” 
actions.150 Second, perhaps because of the doctrinal neglect this issue 
has received, many courts have confused the standard for ruling on 
motions to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction with the standard 
for ruling on motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim.151 Third, 
while proposals to allow a lower standard of proof for jurisdictional 
facts inextricably intertwined with the merits may work well in run-of-
the-mill personal jurisdiction cases, those lower standards are 
problematic in effects-test cases.152 
1. Doctrinal Neglect and Confusion 
The problems of doctrinal neglect and confusion work 
symbiotically. The burden-of-proof issue is rarely raised by the 
 
 149 Professor Kevin Clermont is one of the few scholars to systematically examine 
the standard of proof for both personal jurisdiction and subject matter jurisdiction. 
See, e.g., Clermont, supra note 14, at 1008 (discussing the standard of proof for 
personal and subject matter jurisdiction). 
 150 See Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 790 (1984). 
 151 See infra text accompanying notes 153-60. 
 152 See infra text accompanying notes 187-93. 
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litigants, and so it is rarely explicitly decided by courts. Because of its 
underlying influence in effects-test cases, however, courts have to 
handle the issue at least implicitly. When they do so, they often 
import standards that they apply to other pretrial motions. Thus, for 
example, courts may say that they “must ‘view allegations in the 
pleadings and the documentary evidence in a light most favorable’ to 
the plaintiff and resolv[e] all reasonable competing inferences in favor 
of the plaintiff.”153 
It is not uncommon for courts to apply a plaintiff-deferential 
standard at the jurisdictional stage; courts have applied such a 
standard both to subject-matter jurisdiction challenges and to personal 
jurisdiction challenges, though not without disagreement.154 However, 
the standard is more commonly and more appropriately applied to a 
motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, which derives from the 
common law demurrer.155 At that stage, the idea is the moving party 
should only be able to avoid a jury trial if, even taking all inferences 
against it, there is still no valid claim and, therefore, nothing for the 
 
 153 See Kauffman Racing Equip., L.L.C. v. Roberts, 126 Ohio St. 3d 81, 2010-Ohio-
2551, 930 N.E.2d 784, cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 3089 (2011). 
 154 For subject-matter jurisdiction, compare Saudi Basic Industries Corp. v. 
Exxonmobil Corp., 194 F. Supp. 2d 378, 400 (D.N.J. 2002) (“[I]n a motion to dismiss 
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1), no 
presumption of truthfulness attaches to the allegations in the complaint.”), with Old 
Republic Insurance Co. v. Sidley & Austin, 702 F. Supp. 207, 208 (N.D. Ill. 1988) 
(stating that, in deciding a motion under 12(b)(1), “any inference drawn must be 
favorable to the plaintiff, and the allegations contained in the complaint are to be 
accepted as true” (citation omitted)). For personal jurisdiction, compare QRG, Ltd. v. 
Nartron Corp., No. 06-500, 2006 WL 2583626, at *1 (W.D. Pa. 2006) (“For purposes 
of a Rule 12(b)(2) motion, the court applies the same standard for truthfulness and 
inferences as in a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, that is, accepting as true plaintiff’s version of 
the facts and drawing all inferences in the plaintiff’s favor.”), with Kopff v. Battaglia, 
425 F. Supp. 2d 76, 81 (D.D.C. 2006) (distinguishing the 12(b)(6) context in which a 
court defers to the plaintiff’s well-pleaded allegations and holding that “[w]hen 
considering challenges to personal jurisdiction, the Court need not treat all of 
plaintiffs allegations as true and may receive and weigh affidavits and any other 
relevant matter to assist it in determining the jurisdictional facts” (internal citation 
omitted)), and City of Moundridge v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 471 F. Supp. 2d 20, 36 n.6 
(D.D.C. 2007) (“Plaintiffs rightfully carry a heavier burden in answering a 
jurisdictional challenge under Rule 12(b)(2) than a 12(b)(6) challenge to the 
sufficiency of pled claim.”). 
 155 See Suja A. Thomas, Why the Motion to Dismiss Is Now Unconstitutional, 92 
MINN. L. REV. 1851, 1876 (2008) (noting that for a demurrer at common law: “A court 
simply accepted the facts pled by the plaintiff and any inference in support of the 
plaintiff’s claim . . . however improbable any such inferences might be. The court then 
decided whether a claim existed under these facts.”). 
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jury to decide.156 Without close analysis of the reasons underlying the 
different standards and without guidance from the litigants, a court 
may very well import the Rule 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim) 
standard into jurisdictional determinations under Rule 12(b)(1) 
(subject matter jurisdiction) and Rule 12(b)(2) (personal 
jurisdiction).157 The conflation of the standards is not surprising: both 
questions are raised by pretrial motions under Rule 12(b), and both 
seek dismissal of the claim. 
When close analysis of the underlying bases for dismissal are 
undertaken, it is clear that the standards should be different. A motion 
to dismiss for failure to state a claim is deferential to the plaintiff in 
order to protect the plaintiff’s Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial. 
In contrast, personal jurisdiction protects the defendant’s due process 
rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. Subject matter jurisdiction 
ensures that courts will not exceed the powers given to them by 
Article III and therefore protects federalism interests.158 
In deciding a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, the court is 
not adopting a strict standard in order to ensure that the jury-trial 
right is protected; instead, it is trying to determine whether it has the 
power to hear the claim (in the case of subject matter jurisdiction) or 
power over the parties (in the case of personal jurisdiction). Because 
different constitutional rights are at issue in each decision, the 
consequences of each type of dismissal are also quite different.159 In 
the Rule 12(b)(6) analysis, the only constitutional standard to be 
protected is the plaintiff’s Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial — 
the defendant has no constitutional right to an earlier dismissal.160 As a 
 
 156 See id. at 1890 (“[A] complaint may be dismissed without a violation of the 
Seventh Amendment, but the court must accept as true the facts and corresponding 
inferences pled by the complainant, however probable or not.”); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 
12(b)(6). 
 157 See sources cited supra note 154 and accompanying text. 
 158 See Thomas, supra note 155, at 1876-78 (describing relationship between jury 
trial right and Rule 12(b)(6) motions). 
 159 See Howard M. Wasserman, Jurisdiction, Merits, and Substantiality, 42 TULSA L. 
REV. 579, 597 (2007) (“The dismissal for failure to state a claim will be deemed a 
judgment on the merits, with prejudice and not subject to refiling and having res 
judicata effect on future actions involving the same or related claims or parties. The 
dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction leaves the plaintiff free to refile her 
federal and state claims in another forum.”). Similarly, the dismissal for lack of 
personal jurisdiction leaves the plaintiff free to file in a more appropriate jurisdiction. 
FED. R. CIV. P. 41(b) (specifying that dismissal for lack of jurisdiction does not operate 
as an adjudication on the merits). 
 160 And, in fact, some scholars have argued that not only is there no constitutional 
right to pretrial dismissal, but current dismissal practices for 12(b)(6) motions and 
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result, even an erroneous decision to deny a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal 
would not infringe any constitutional right, though the corresponding 
error in granting such a motion would deny the plaintiff’s right to a 
jury trial. Thus, the court accepts the plaintiff’s allegations as true to 
ensure that it does not usurp the jury’s fact-finding role. Conversely, if 
the court errs in allowing a case to proceed where it lacks jurisdiction, 
it is exercising a power that it lacks under the Constitution and 
infringing on the defendant’s right to due process.161 If the court 
automatically accepts the plaintiff’s allegations as true, it will be 
assuming the existence of facts giving rise to jurisdiction — and it will 
thereby assume the existence of jurisdiction even in cases where it 
lacks the power to act. 
Recognizing the importance of the jurisdictional determination, the 
Supreme Court long ago held that the party seeking to invoke the 
court’s jurisdiction (usually the plaintiff) has the burden of proof to 
demonstrate jurisdiction generally and must do so by a preponderance 
of the evidence.162 The Court provided that when the defendant 
challenges those facts, the plaintiff “must support them by competent 
proof,” and that regardless of whether the defendant contests those 
facts, “the court may demand that the party alleging jurisdiction 
justify his allegations by a preponderance of evidence.”163 
 
summary judgment are affirmatively unconstitutional. See Thomas, supra note 155, at 
1876; see also Suja A. Thomas, Why Summary Judgment Is Unconstitutional, 93 VA. L. 
REV. 139, 141-42 (2007). 
 161 See Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 578, 583-84 (1999); Scott 
C. Idleman, The Emergence of Jurisdictional Resequencing in the Federal Courts, 87 
CORNELL L. REV. 1, 9-12 (2001) (characterizing “subject matter jurisdiction [as] a 
nonwaivable delimitation of federal power, personal jurisdiction a waivable guarantee 
of individual liberty,” both of which are “essential and constitutional aspect of federal 
judicial power”). 
 162 See McNutt v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp. of Ind., 298 U.S. 178, 189 (1936); 
see also Lonny Sheinkopf Hoffman, Burdens of Jurisdictional Proof, 59 ALA. L. REV. 409, 
411 (2008) (arguing, in the class action context, that shifting the burden to the party 
arguing against jurisdiction “is the civil procedural equivalent of saying that criminal 
defendants are now guilty until proven innocent.”).  
 163 See McNutt, 298 U.S. at 189 (addressing subject matter jurisdiction). In the 
personal jurisdiction context, this has expanded to mean that the plaintiff has the 
burden to show minimum contacts/purposeful availment. After the plaintiff does so, 
the burden then shifts to the defendant to show why the exercise of jurisdiction would 
be unreasonable. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 477 (1985) 
(“[W]here a defendant who purposefully has directed his activities at forum residents 
seeks to defeat jurisdiction, he must present a compelling case that the presence of 
some other considerations would render jurisdiction unreasonable.”). 
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Thus, although a number of courts have resolved competing 
versions of the facts in favor of the plaintiff,164 such decisions are in 
error; the Supreme Court has required a higher level of proof for 
jurisdictional allegations and does not generally allow the plaintiff’s 
allegations to be merely taken as true.165 Lower standards should be 
accepted only when the defendant does not contest the jurisdictional 
allegations166 or in a preliminary response to the motion to dismiss 
that will be supplanted after discovery.167 While some authorities have 
suggested that the court has flexibility to apply the lower pretrial 
standard without revisiting it later,168 the stronger view is that the 
plaintiff must reach the higher standard at some point before 
judgment; otherwise, the court may render judgment without ever 
having established the facts necessary to support jurisdiction.169 
 
 164 See, e.g., Mercantile Capital, LP v. Fed. Transtel, Inc., 193 F. Supp. 2d 1243, 
1247 (N.D. Ala. 2002) (“[I]f the parties present conflicting evidence, all factual 
disputes are resolved in the plaintiff’s favor, and the plaintiff’s prima facie showing 
will be sufficient to survive the motion to dismiss notwithstanding the contrary 
presentation by the moving party.”); see also CASAD & RICHMAN, supra note 14 (“Most 
courts refuse to engage in an evidentiary inquiry on the jurisdiction issue, and if the 
plaintiff has pleaded in good faith a prima facie case of tort, the case will not be 
dismissed.”). 
 165 See McNutt, 298 U.S. at 189. 
 166 See, e.g., Welsh v. Gibbs, 631 F.2d 436, 439 (6th Cir. 1980) (applying a lower 
standard when “the written materials presented no disputed questions of fact on 
jurisdiction and no issues of credibility”). 
 167 See, e.g., Ball v. Metallurgie Hoboken-Overpelt, S.A., 902 F.2d 194, 197 (2d Cir. 
1990) (“Prior to discovery, a plaintiff challenged by a jurisdiction testing motion may 
defeat the motion by pleading in good faith . . . . After discovery, the plaintiff’s prima 
facie showing, necessary to defeat a jurisdiction testing motion, must include an 
averment of facts that, if credited by the trier, would suffice to establish jurisdiction 
over the defendant . . . . If the defendant contests the plaintiff’s factual allegations, 
then a hearing is required, at which the plaintiff must prove the existence of 
jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence.”). 
 168 See, e.g., O’Bryan v. McDonald, 952 P.2d 636, 638 (Wyo. 1998) (“The court 
may determine the matter on the basis of pleadings and other materials called to its 
attention; it may require discovery; or it may conduct an evidentiary hearing . . . . The 
procedural path the district court chooses to follow determines the plaintiff’s burden 
of proof and the standard to be applied on appeal.”). 
 169 See, e.g., 4 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 
§ 1351 (3d ed. 2011) (“Deferring the ruling will enable the parties to employ 
discovery on the jurisdictional issue and might lead to a more accurate judgment on 
the subject than one made solely on the basis of affidavits.”); see also Hyatt Int’l Corp. 
v. Coco, 302 F.3d 707, 713 (7th Cir. 2002) (“If personal jurisdiction is challenged 
under Rule 12(b)(2), the court must decide whether any material facts are in dispute. 
If so, it must hold an evidentiary hearing to resolve them, at which point the party 
asserting personal jurisdiction must prove what it alleged.”); see also Clermont, supra 
note 14, at 992 n.79 (noting that “lowering the standard for early determinations is 
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2. The Prima Facie Standard for Inextricable Merits Cases 
As described above, the existence of jurisdictional facts must be 
established; the court cannot merely assume that the plaintiff’s 
jurisdictional allegations are correct. The question then arises: when, 
and by what standard, should jurisdiction be proved? Most 
jurisdictional facts can be established pretrial, either because they are 
undisputed, or because the court can hold an evidentiary hearing to 
determine jurisdiction.170 The standard for jurisdictional proof 
becomes much more complex when jurisdictional facts are 
inextricably intertwined with the merits.171 
The Supreme Court has expressed concern that the trial judge not 
prematurely evaluate the merits at the jurisdictional stage. In cases 
where issues of jurisdiction and merits overlap, the Court has 
therefore allowed the plaintiff to go to trial on a very modest showing 
of jurisdiction.172 Thus, courts have held that “where the jurisdictional 
 
nonsensical, because the lowered standard would force defendants who eventually 
prevail on the merits to defend in a forum where by law they supposedly need not 
defend,” and concluding that “[m]ost likely, such judicial statements in favor of an 
early lowered standard are merely loose and confused talk to which the court has no 
intention of giving tangible effect,” as “apparently no actual case exists in which the 
court upheld jurisdiction by a lowered standard on pretrial motion and then properly 
found no jurisdiction at trial under the higher standard, as opposed to cases that 
straightforwardly postponed the jurisdictional issue until determination at trial.”).  
Of course, even the preponderance standard leaves some room for error. See 
William P. Marshall, The “Facts” of Federal Subject Matter Jurisdiction, 35 DEPAUL L. 
REV. 23, 50 (1985) (“A margin of error is implicit in fact-finding and cannot be 
eliminated even when the underlying issue is jurisdiction.”). 
 170 Clermont, supra note 14, at 985 (“The judge determines the issue on 
documentary proof and affidavits and, if necessary, after an evidentiary hearing.”). 
 171 Id. at 976-77 (concluding that the plaintiff “should not have to prove her cause 
of action in order to establish jurisdiction,” and noting that such a requirement would 
lead to problematic consequences including costly proceedings, res judicata problems, 
and the possibility of the judge usurping the jury’s role). 
 172 Id. at 1008 (“But as usual, the court in deciding jurisdiction must avoid trying 
the merits. The standard therefore must be lowered to prima facie proof for issues that 
overlap the merits.”) (citing Smithers v. Smith, 204 U.S. 632, 645 (1907) (holding that 
a judge’s discretion to dismiss a case apparently without jurisdiction should be subject 
to certain limits, “lest, under the guise of determining jurisdiction, the merits of the 
controversy between the parties be summarily decided without the ordinary incidents 
of a trial”)). 
It is possible that the Supreme Court is overly cautious in not allowing pretrial 
jurisdictional evidence that overlaps with the merits. As Professor Clermont argued in 
a later article, a judge-made pretrial determination would not bind a subsequent jury 
and would not have a res judicata effect. Kevin M. Clermont, Sequencing the Issues for 
Judicial Decisionmaking: Limitations from Jurisdictional Primacy and Intrasuit Preclusion, 
63 FLA. L. REV. 301, 338 (2011) (“Although there is no constitutional jury right on 
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issue cannot be decided without the ruling constituting at the same 
time a ruling on the merits,” the “necessary choice . . . is to permit the 
cause to proceed to trial,” as long as the plaintiff can make a prima 
facie showing of jurisdiction.173 Many courts will apply the prima facie 
standard pretrial, to be superseded by proof by a preponderance of the 
evidence at trial.174 Of course, the effect of this changed standard 
allows a court to determine that it lacks jurisdiction even after fully 
trying the case on the merits.175 
Various alternatives to a post-trial decision on jurisdiction have 
been offered. One prominent civil procedure scholar has suggested 
that the reasonableness factors should take on a greater role and that 
prelitigation contacts with the forum need not be considered at all.176 
Another scholar has suggested that the prima facie standard should 
apply at all stages of the litigation, not just pretrial.177 Each of these 
solutions is problematic in effects-test cases. 
First, ignoring prelitigation contact with the forum entirely would 
not solve the predictability problem. A defendant could be sued in 
potentially any forum; to resist jurisdiction, the defendant would have 
to prove why it is an unreasonable choice, developing evidence of cost, 
inconvenience, and lack of state interest.178 That proceeding alone 
 
jurisdictional issues, courts and commentators equivocate on whether a jury must first 
determine any common issue. But they are wrong to equivocate. Beacon Theatres–
Dairy Queen applies only to issues common to joined legal and equitable claims, not to 
issues common to jurisdiction and the merits.”). Thus, it is theoretically possible that 
a judge could determine jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence pretrial and 
then allow the jury to make a merits determination at trial. Id. (“[T]he judge can 
decide jurisdiction at the outset, and the jury can decide anew the common issue at 
the regular trial.”). However, because such a procedure would essentially require two 
trials presenting the same evidence, it would be highly inefficient and unlikely to 
appeal to judges facing overcrowded dockets. 
 173 Wade v. Rogala, 270 F.2d 280, 285 (3rd Cir. 1959). 
 174 See, e.g., Forsythe v. Overmyer, 576 F.2d 779, 781 (9th Cir. 1978) (“Whatever 
degree of proof is required initially, a plaintiff must have proved by the end of trial the 
jurisdictional facts by a preponderance of the evidence.”). 
 175 See Clermont, supra note 14, at 993-94. 
 176 See Redish, supra note 16, at 1115 (proposing a new test that “would eliminate 
two factors of central importance to the ‘minimum contacts’ test — concern for 
prelitigation contacts between the defendant and the forum and for the defendant’s 
awareness of possible suit in that forum — except to the extent such factors relate to 
the actual burdens of litigation.”). 
 177 Clermont, supra note 14, at 1004-05 (noting that “[a]t each step of the legal 
analysis on jurisdiction, the plaintiff should be able to survive by making some sort of 
plausible showing that might not measure up to more-likely-than-not,” and 
summarizing the benefits of such a rule). 
 178 Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472, 476-77 (1985). 
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would be burdensome and would likely require significant discovery 
only to reach the jurisdictional decision.179 Other scholars have noted 
that the purpose of personal jurisdiction is to protect two different 
interests: while one is the potential burden on the defendant, another 
is “a concern for a defendant’s liberty through self-regulation of its 
conduct.”180 A policy of ignoring prelitigation contacts would serve at 
most the burden interest, but could not offer the opportunity for self-
regulation. 
Second, waiting until trial to resolve the question of personal 
jurisdiction in cases where the merits of the claim are inextricably 
intertwined with the jurisdictional question makes the defendant’s due 
process right to challenge jurisdiction largely illusory.181 This is not 
problematic if the defendant loses on the merits because such a 
decision necessarily means that the court possessed personal 
jurisdiction over the defendant.182 In contrast, if the defendant wins on 
the merits, either in the trial court, or through a successful appeal, 
then the court may be forced to conclude that there was no personal 
jurisdiction over the defendant.183 Thus, such a “win” for the 
defendant is really a loss because the favorable decision would not be 
binding; the plaintiff would be free to sue again in a location where 
personal jurisdiction was proper.184 Presumably, a defendant who wins 
on the merits could also waive any former jurisdictional objection in 
order to avoid dismissal of the case and protect the merits ruling from 
relitigation in another forum.185 But even a defendant who could 
 
 179 S.I. Strong, Jurisdictional Discovery in United States Federal Courts, 67 WASH. & 
LEE L. REV. 489, 539 (2010) (analyzing the burdens of jurisdictional discovery and 
noting the higher burden where jurisdiction determination “involves early disclosure 
of numerous facts that are intimately associated with liability on the merits”). 
 180 Michael P. Allen, In Rem Jurisdiction from Pennoyer to Shaffer to the 
Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act, 11 GEO. MASON L. REV. 243, 274 (2002). 
 181 See Althouse, supra note 14, at 257 (“Complete merger of the jurisdictional 
issue with the trial on the merits imposes this burden on the defendant regardless of 
whether there is jurisdiction, and therefore is unacceptable under a modern 
analysis.”). 
 182 See supra Part II.B. 
 183 Clermont, supra note 14, at 981; see also Nelson v. Miller, 143 N.E.2d 673, 681 
(Ill. 1957) (“Thus the defendant who successfully litigated the issue of liability for 
jurisdictional purposes in our courts might be subjected to a second trial of the issue 
on the merits in the courts of another State.”). 
 184 Clermont, supra note 14, at 981-82. 
 185 Id. at 994 (concluding that defendants who win at trial “would risk . . . a 
jurisdictional dismissal after the successful defense on the merits, unless the 
defendants can then consent to jurisdiction and thereby sidestep the payback for their 
success”). 
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secure a favorable judgment would still have forfeited the “liberty 
interest in not being subject to the binding judgments of a forum with 
which he has established no meaningful ‘contacts, ties, or relations,’ ” 
which is the primary constitutional interest that the personal 
jurisdiction doctrine was developed to protect.186 
Third, accepting a lower prima facie standard for jurisdiction also 
infringes on defendants’ right not to appear in a forum that lacks 
personal jurisdiction over them. While the Court has characterized the 
personal jurisdiction doctrine as the right to be free from a binding 
judgment rather than the right to be free from prejudgment 
proceedings,187 it has also provided an opt-out mechanism for the 
defendant who wishes to avoid all such prejudgment proceedings. The 
defendant who contests jurisdiction “is always free to ignore the 
judicial proceedings, risk a default judgment, and then challenge that 
judgment on jurisdictional grounds in a collateral proceeding.”188 On 
collateral attack, the reviewing court would engage in a jurisdictional 
inquiry to determine whether the original forum possessed personal 
jurisdiction over the defendant. If it did, then the reviewing court 
would be obligated to give the default judgment full faith and credit.189 
If it did not, then the court would refuse to enforce the judgment 
against the defendant.190 
If the jurisdictional standard is lowered, and if this lowered standard 
also applies to collateral attacks on a default judgment, then the 
defendant would not dare to default in the first forum in effects-test 
cases.191 Cases where the merits appear balanced before trial, like 
 
 186 Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 471-72 (1985) (quoting Int’l 
Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945)); see also Charles W. “Rocky” 
Rhodes, Liberty, Substantive Due Process, and Personal Jurisdiction, 82 TUL. L. REV. 567, 
604 (2007) (“[A] fundamental liberty interest is at stake when the state seeks to 
employ its binding adjudicative power against a person who has not established a 
purposeful relationship with it.”). 
 187 Van Cauwenberghe v. Biard, 486 U.S. 517, 527 (1988) (“Because the right not 
to be subject to a binding judgment may be effectively vindicated following final 
judgment, we have held that the denial of a claim of lack of jurisdiction is not an 
immediately appealable collateral order.”). 
 188 Ins. Co. of Ireland v. Compagnie Des Bauxites, 456 U.S. 694, 706 (1982). 
 189 Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 733 (1877) (“Since the adoption of the 
Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution, the validity of such judgments 
may be directly questioned, and their enforcement in the State resisted, on the ground 
that proceedings in a court of justice to determine the personal rights and obligations 
of parties over whom that court has no jurisdiction do not constitute due process of 
law.”). 
 190 Id. 
 191 See Patrick Woolley, The Jurisdictional Nature of Adequate Representation in Class 
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Dudnikov and Kauffman Racing, show that it is often easy for the 
plaintiff to establish a prima facie case for jurisdiction; only 
evidentiary development and merits-based adjudication could 
establish whether Roberts’ speech was truthful criticism or wrongful 
defamation (in Kauffman Racing) and whether Chalk & Vermilion’s 
interference in the plaintiffs’ online auction was a legitimate protection 
of their intellectual property or a tortious interference with business 
relations (in Dudnikov). 
Professor Clermont, who advocates the prima facie standard for 
jurisdictional facts that overlap the merits, agrees that the standard is 
inappropriate for fundamental questions like the identity of the 
defendant: 
[T]hink of mistaken identity for a defendant who defaulted 
because he had no connection whatsoever with a totally 
misled plaintiff. Upon enforcement of the default judgment at 
the defendant’s home, the system would intuitively let him 
maintain that the in-state actor had not been him, even if the 
plaintiff could make a plausible showing of same name and 
likeness. Foreclosing collateral attack would be unfair. Indeed, 
that result would create a worldwide service provision. No 
defendant could risk defaulting, because too much would be at 
stake under conditions too uncertain.192 
In Clermont’s scheme, the prima facie standard works because there is 
a hierarchy of jurisdictional facts; fundamental questions like the 
defendant’s identity may be subject to a higher standard, while other 
questions with greater overlap with the merits can be demonstrated by 
a lesser showing.193 
The problem with effects-test cases, however, is that they lack the 
same hierarchy of jurisdictional facts. It is not that the jurisdictional 
and merits questions share a few common issues; instead, it is that 
there is nearly a complete identity of issue in the two analyses. The 
question is whether the defendant committed an intentional act 
directed at causing harm in the plaintiff’s home state.194 That is the 
only question supporting jurisdiction, and its affirmative answer will 
also support liability. As a result, Professor Clermont’s sense that it 
 
Litigation, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 410, 423 (2011) (“Indeed, a rational litigant will 
waive the objection if it would be in his or her interest to litigate in the courts of a 
sovereign lacking an appropriate connection with him or her.”). 
 192 See Clermont, supra note 14, at 997. 
 193 Id. 
 194 See sources cited supra notes 86-87. 
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would be unfair to prevent the defendant from contesting a case of 
mistaken identity should apply equally to allow a defendant to contest 
the facts underlying the imposition of effects-test jurisdiction. 
Strict application of the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard 
would ensure that defendants retain the right to challenge jurisdiction 
in a collateral attack.195 Such an approach may go further, however, 
and actually encourage defendants to do so, rendering the forum 
state’s long-arm statute ineffective in effects-test cases. Because 
jurisdiction and merits overlap completely in these cases, any post-
default collateral attack that challenges jurisdiction necessarily also 
challenges the merits of the claim. And if a defendant can always 
contest the merits on collateral attack, then there is little incentive to 
appear for trial in the contested jurisdiction — defendants may well 
prefer to default and then to contest the merits of the claim in their 
home jurisdiction. This incentive is unavoidable in effects-test cases.196 
When jurisdiction and merits are so thoroughly intertwined, a lesser 
standard of jurisdictional proof precludes the defendant from 
collaterally challenging a default, while a preponderance standard 
encourages the defendant to default and make a collateral challenge 
later. However, this all-or-nothing scenario applies only in pure 
effects-test cases; when there are traditional indicia of purposeful 
contacts, such as sales, advertising, or contractual relations, then the 
jurisdictional question can be resolved separately from the merits, and 
a later collateral attack on jurisdiction would not automatically allow 
the defendant to litigate the underlying merits. 
 
 195 See Suzanna Sherry, Judicial Federalism in the Trenches: The Rooker-Feldman 
Doctrine in Action, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1085, 1094 n.39 (1999) (“A default 
judgment attacked for lack of jurisdiction . . . [can be collaterally attacked] because 
the party did not have a full and fair opportunity to litigate the question without 
forfeiting the very protection that personal jurisdiction doctrines are designed to 
afford. To hold otherwise would be to require a defendant to litigate jurisdictional 
issues in the forum he claims has no jurisdiction over him.”). 
 196 The right to launch a collateral attack is constitutionally protected. See Allan 
Erbsen, Impersonal Jurisdiction, 60 EMORY L.J. 1, 76 (2010) (“[S]ometimes external 
judicial systems must intervene: for example, the federal judiciary when the defendant 
appeals to the Supreme Court, or other states’ judiciaries when the plaintiff seeks to 
enforce a judgment rendered without personal jurisdiction and the defendant mounts 
a collateral attack. But no matter which institution reins in the offending state, it does 
so because of a right that the Constitution empowers the individual defendant to 
assert.”); Sherry, supra note 193, at 1094 n.39. 
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B. What Contacts Count? 
The prior subpart argued that courts should not automatically 
accept the plaintiff’s jurisdictional allegations as true, but should 
instead apply the traditional preponderance-of-the-evidence standard 
to determine whether there is personal jurisdiction. It also argued that, 
at least in effects-test cases, the court should not accept a lower 
standard of proof for the issues of wrongfulness and harm — issues 
that largely determine both the jurisdictional question and the 
ultimate liability question. The question then becomes how to resolve 
closely balanced effects-test cases like Kauffman Racing or Dudnikov 
without making assumptions as to wrongfulness and harm. 
In many of the more difficult cases, the actions giving rise to the suit 
are not challenged — only the wrongfulness of those actions is 
disputed. In Kauffman Racing, Roberts did not deny criticizing the 
company online; he denied only that his comments were 
defamatory.197 Likewise, in Dudnikov, Chalk & Vermilion did not deny 
attempting to stop the eBay merchants from selling their fabric; they 
denied only that their interference with those sales was tortious.198 
But can nonwrongful conduct give rise to effects-test jurisdiction? 
Assuming, for example, that Chalk & Vermilion’s action was not 
wrongful — that it legitimately sought to stop the sale of an infringing 
product located in Colorado — would its action nevertheless be 
sufficient to subject it to suit in Colorado? Likewise, if Roberts’s 
comments were nondefamatory attempts to warn customers away 
from an unscrupulous seller, would he still be subject to jurisdiction 
in Ohio? 
Currently only the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has 
answered in the affirmative and allowed effects-test-based personal 
jurisdiction even in cases where the defendant’s conduct — though 
targeted to have an effect in-state — was not itself wrongful.199 In 
Yahoo!, Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme et L’Antisemitisme, French 
civil rights groups objected to Nazi artifacts and Holocaust-denial 
materials being sold on Yahoo!’s online auction site, which could be 
accessed and viewed in France. The groups sent a cease-and-desist 
 
 197 See supra notes 99-114. 
 198 See supra notes 115-26. 
 199 Yahoo! Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme Et L’Antisemitisme, 433 F.3d 1199, 
1208 (9th Cir. 2006) (“[W]e do not read Calder necessarily to require in purposeful 
direction cases that all (or even any) jurisdictionally relevant effects have been caused 
by wrongful acts.”); id. at 1208 (“We do not see how we could do so, for if an 
allegedly wrongful act were the basis for jurisdiction, a holding on the merits that the 
act was not wrongful would deprive the court of jurisdiction.”). 
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letter to Yahoo!’s headquarters in California, asserting that Yahoo!’s 
conduct violated French law. When they failed to get a satisfactory 
response, they sued for an injunction in France (and served process on 
Yahoo! in California). The plaintiffs obtained orders from a French 
court ordering Yahoo! to “take all necessary measures to . . . render 
impossible any access [from French territory] via Yahoo.com to the 
Nazi artifact auction service and to any other site or service that may 
be construed as constituting an apology for Nazism or a contesting of 
Nazi crimes.”200 Yahoo! then the sued French groups in California, 
seeking a declaratory judgment that the French orders were not 
enforceable in the United States. The French groups objected to 
personal jurisdiction in California. 
In an en banc opinion, the Ninth Circuit held that California could 
properly exercise personal jurisdiction over the French groups.201 Of 
the three potential contacts it identified — sending the cease-and-
desist letter, serving process in California, and securing the orders 
from a French court — it held that the first two actions could not give 
rise to jurisdiction for reasons of public policy.202 With regard to the 
letter, the court reasoned that: 
If the price of sending a cease and desist letter is that the 
sender thereby subjects itself to jurisdiction in the forum of 
the alleged rights infringer, the rights holder will be strongly 
encouraged to file suit in its home forum without attempting 
first to resolve the dispute informally by means of a letter.203 
Likewise, the court worried that holding service of process sufficient 
to create jurisdiction “would be providing a forum-choice tool by 
which any United States resident sued in a foreign country and served 
in the United States could bring suit in the United States, regardless of 
any other basis for jurisdiction.”204 
However, the Ninth Circuit was willing to base jurisdiction on the 
third contact — the plaintiffs’ action in securing the French court 
orders — because the orders required Yahoo! to take action in 
California. The court conceded that “[i]t is of course true that the 
effect desired by the French court would be felt in France,” but 
 
 200 Id. at 1202. 
 201 In spite of the majority support for the personal jurisdiction holding, the court 
dismissed Yahoo!’s action; while the court was fractured, a majority of the judges all 
supported dismissal, though on various grounds. Id. at 1201. 
 202 Id. at 1208-09. 
 203 Id. at 1208. 
 204 Id. at 1209. 
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concluded that “the fact that significant acts were to be performed in 
California” provided a sufficient basis for effects-test jurisdiction.205 
Thus, even though the groups’ actions in France were neither 
wrongful nor tortious (French law supported their claims), those 
actions were designed to have an effect in California by requiring 
Yahoo to make changes to its computer servers in California.206 The 
Ninth Circuit found the issue of personal jurisdiction to be “a close 
question,” but concluded that California could legitimately exercise 
personal jurisdiction.207 
To date no court has followed the Ninth Circuit by allowing 
nonwrongful actions to support effects-test jurisdiction. At least two 
other circuits, however, have explicitly avoided deciding that question 
by taking the plaintiff’s allegations of wrongfulness as true for 
purposes of jurisdiction.208 
Under current Supreme Court doctrine, the Ninth Circuit probably 
erred in several ways by extending the effects test to nonwrongful 
conduct. First, recent dicta implies that only cases involving 
intentional torts may be exempt from the need to prove purposeful 
availment “of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum 
State.”209 Second, in a case predating the acceptance of the effects test 
in Calder, the Supreme Court stated that the effects test is meant to 
reach wrongful or tortious conduct; it is not intended to apply to every 
case in which the defendant “caused an ‘effect’ in” the forum state.210 
 
 205 Id. 
 206 Id. (“The servers that support yahoo.com are located in California, and 
compliance with the French court’s orders necessarily would require Yahoo! to make 
some changes to those servers.”). 
 207 Id. at 1211. 
 208 See, e.g., Tamburo v. Dworkin, 601 F.3d 693, 704 (7th Cir. 2010) (“The circuits 
are divided over whether Calder’s ‘express aiming’ inquiry includes all jurisdictionally 
relevant intentional acts of the defendant or only those acts that are intentional and 
alleged to be tortious or otherwise wrongful . . . . We need not take sides in this 
debate. Tamburo alleges that the individual defendants intentionally published 
defamatory statements on their websites or in blast emails.”); Dudnikov v. Chalk & 
Vermilion Fine Arts, Inc., 514 F.3d 1063, 1073 (10th Cir. 2008) (“As it happens, we 
are able to avoid entering this thicket. Even if Calder can be properly read as requiring 
some form of ‘wrongful’ intentional conduct, we agree with plaintiffs that their 
complaint complies.”). 
 209 J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2785 (2011) (plurality 
opinion) (“There may be exceptions [to purposeful availment], say, for instance, in 
cases involving an intentional tort.”). 
 210 Kulko v. Superior Court of Cal., 436 U.S. 84, 96 (1978); see also Michelle 
Feldman, Putting the Brakes on Libel Tourism: Examining the Effects Test as a Basis for 
Personal Jurisdiction Under New York’s Libel Terrorism Protection Act, 31 CARDOZO L. 
REV. 2457, 2482 (2010) (referencing Kulko and concluding that “if the purpose of the 
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Although the Supreme Court itself has never revisited the effects test, 
most subsequent lower-court cases have assumed the test applied only 
to wrongful conduct.211 
Furthermore, it is not clear that courts have the power to exert 
personal jurisdiction based on extraterritorial conduct that was not 
even allegedly tortious. As Professor Spencer has noted, “The basis for 
a state’s authority to adjudicate is derivative of the police power that it 
enjoys domestically.”212 While the state’s police power is very broad, it 
is not unlimited.213 The state’s interest in adjudicating a dispute is 
weaker than its interest in having its own law apply to the case.214 
These principles cut against the idea that extraterritorial conduct with 
nonwrongful effects in the forum should give rise to personal 
jurisdiction.215 
The case against personal jurisdiction based on extraterritorial 
regulation is especially strong when the conduct at issue may be 
constitutionally protected. As Professor Allan Erbsen has noted, 
“[A]ny assertion in the form ‘State X lacks power to regulate activity Y’ 
can be restated as ‘actors engaging in activity Y have a right not be 
regulated by state X.’ ”216 State X may have the power to regulate out-
 
personal jurisdiction analysis is to determine whether the exercise of such jurisdiction 
would violate the defendant’s due process rights, then there is good reason to require 
wrongfulness”). 
 211 See, e.g., Yahoo!, 433 F.3d at 1231 (Ferguson, J., concurring) (objecting to the 
Yahoo majority’s decision to include nonwrongful conduct in the jurisdiction calculus 
of an effects-test case, and noting that “every ‘purposeful direction’ case that the 
majority cites in its opinion involved tortious or otherwise wrongful acts by the 
defendants”); IMO Indus. v. Kiekert AG, 155 F.3d 254, 265-66 (3d Cir.1998) 
(requiring commission of an intentional tort). 
 212 A. Benjamin Spencer, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A Revised Analysis, 73 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 617, 650 (2006); see also Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 643 (1982) 
(plurality opinion) (“The limits on a State’s power to enact substantive legislation are 
similar to the limits on the jurisdiction of state courts.”). 
 213 Spencer, supra note 14, at 651 n.158 (citing Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 
824 (1975) (“A State does not acquire power or supervision over the internal affairs of 
another State merely because the welfare and health of its own citizens may be 
affected when they travel to that State.”)). 
 214 Id.; see also Lea Brilmayer & Kathleen Paisley, Personal Jurisdiction and 
Substantive Legal Relations: Corporations, Conspiracies, and Agency, 74 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 
40 (1986) (“[T]o the extent that different standards should be used for jurisdictional 
than for substantive purposes, these standards should be more restrictive, not more 
lenient.”). 
 215 Spencer, supra note 14, at 650 (concluding that “those not alleged to have 
acted, in some way, to violate the tranquility and order provided by a state 
domestically cannot be said to fall within that state’s sphere of authority”). 
 216 Allan Erbsen, Horizontal Federalism, 93 MINN. L. REV. 493, 564 (2008). 
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of-state speech that defames a state resident. If, however, the speech is 
not defamatory, then residents speaking in State Y may have a right 
not to be regulated by State X. 
Thus, the stronger view is that the effects test, as currently 
formulated, requires wrongful or tortious conduct. It should be noted, 
however, that the wrongfulness requirement applies only to effects-
based jurisdiction; it does not apply to conduct in which the defendant 
“purposefully avails” itself of forum-state benefits and laws.217 The 
Supreme Court distinguished between the two types of jurisdiction in 
Burger King, contrasting the two different state interests that give rise 
to jurisdiction: the first interest is “redressing injuries” to in-state 
residents; the second is an “account[ing] . . . for the consequences” in 
the forum state that arise from parties’ attempts to “ ‘purposefully 
derive benefit’ from their interstate activities.”218 Thus, cases 
demonstrating purposeful availment through in-state presence, 
commerce, or contracts rarely require analysis of effects and do not 
require wrongful conduct.219 Cases that lack such purposeful 
availment and rely only on in-state harm, however, should be limited 
to cases of wrongful or tortious conduct. 
C. The Reframed Standard 
When the standard of proof for personal jurisdiction is reframed as 
explained above, it becomes much more difficult for a court to make a 
finding of effects-test personal jurisdiction. A court can no longer 
assume for jurisdictional purposes that the plaintiff’s allegations of 
wrongfulness and harm are true; instead, those allegations must be 
proven by a preponderance of the evidence.220 Nor can a court base 
jurisdiction on the uncontested, but nonwrongful, actions that have an 
effect in the target forum.221 As a result, courts cannot find effects-test 
jurisdiction without engaging in a rigorous evidence-based analysis; 
 
 217 See, e.g., Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 774 (1984) (basing 
jurisdiction on in-state magazine sales); McGee v. Int’l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 
222-23 (1957) (basing jurisdiction on solicitation of a life insurance policy); Yahoo! 
Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme Et L’Antisemitisme, 433 F.3d 1199, 1231 (9th Cir. 
2006) (Ferguson, J., concurring). 
 218 Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 473-74 (1985). 
 219 See Katherine Florey, State Courts, State Territory, State Power: Reflections on the 
Extraterritoriality Principle in Choice of Law and Legislation, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
1057, 1133 (2009) (“Even in the minimum contacts realm, effects-based analysis is 
sometimes limited to suits based on tortious conduct, and is not the framework that 
applies to suits in contract.”). 
 220 See supra Part III.A. 
 221 See supra Part III.B. 
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because that same analysis would be the focus of liability as well, a 
court would have to delay the jurisdictional determination until 
trial.222 
In a few cases, it may be possible to resolve the jurisdictional 
question early without usurping the jury’s role. Such cases may 
present undisputed or conclusively proven factual allegations, such 
that summary judgment would be appropriate.223 In these cases, the 
judge could make a pretrial determination of wrongfulness and harm 
without infringing on the right to a jury trial.224 These cases are likely 
to be few and far between, however, as cases that are strongly one-
sided usually settle rather than proceed to adjudication.225 
In the more common case where wrongfulness is hotly disputed, the 
revised standard offers two difficult options: delay the personal 
jurisdiction determination until trial, thus denying the defendant the 
protection that the doctrine was meant to protect,226 or close the 
forum to the plaintiff and require that suit be filed elsewhere. The next 
Part considers these options more fully. 
 
 222 As noted above, the court may theoretically have the option of trying the case 
twice: once to the judge at the jurisdictional stage, and another time to the jury on the 
merits. However, the Supreme Court has never suggested such a procedure in cases 
where the merits are intertwined with jurisdiction and the practical inefficiencies of 
trying a case twice make it unlikely that such a procedure would gain judicial support. 
See supra note 172; see also Stefania A. Di Trolio, Undermining and Unintwining: The 
Right to a Jury Trial and Rule 12(b)(1), 33 SETON HALL L. REV. 1247, 1276 n.212, 1282 
(2003) (“[T]he function of the “intertwined with the merits” exception is to ensure 
that issues of fact normally decided by the jury are not summarily decided by the 
court. Thus, the purpose of the exception is to make certain that the plaintiff’s right to 
a jury trial is not infringed upon. In order for the exception to serve its purpose, it 
must be applied both consistently and correctly.” (citations omitted)). 
 223 See FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a) (“The court shall grant summary judgment if the 
movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant 
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”). 
 224 Id. One example where wrongfulness cannot reasonably be contested is 
solicitation of violent criminal conduct — in a number of recent cases, for example, 
vengeful individuals have posted Craigslist ads posing as women who seek sexual 
contact. See Stephanie Reitz, Police Say Feud Led to Fake Sex Ad, CHARLESTON DAILY 
MAIL, Apr. 23, 2010, at 6A. If the victim filed a civil lawsuit in her home state, the 
issue of wrongfulness and harm could presumably be determined as a matter of law.  
 225 George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 1, 4-5 (1984) (studying the selection effect of cases settled versus 
litigated); Michael E. Solimine, The Quiet Revolution in Personal Jurisdiction, 73 TUL. L. 
REV. 1, 12 (1998) (“Rational litigants will settle the strongest and weakest cases, 
leaving only the difficult and uncertain cases to go to trial.”). 
 226 See supra Part III.A.2 (explaining that if the defendant must wait until after trial 
for a jurisdictional determination, the protections of the personal jurisdiction doctrine 
will be largely illusory). 
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IV. CONSEQUENCES OF THE REFRAMED STANDARD 
As described above, the effects test has been plagued by doctrinal 
inconsistency and confusion, resulting in conflicting opinions and 
unpredictable outcomes. When these doctrinal inconsistencies are 
reconciled, a troubling paradox emerges: defendants should be subject 
to trial in the target forum only when they have intentionally engaged 
in wrongful conduct that targets the plaintiff’s chosen forum, but the 
determination of whether the defendants’ conduct was wrongful 
cannot generally occur prior to trial. 
There is no easy or perfect resolution to this paradox. Professor 
Clermont has characterized the competing errors as “Type I” — an 
error that contravenes the “policy against failing to limit the burden 
on the defendant” — and “Type II” — an error that fails “to provide a 
forum to the plaintiff.”227 Although no personal jurisdiction doctrine 
can eliminate both types of errors, the goal is to limit the sum of both 
types.228 The Calder effects test leans heavily toward avoiding Type II 
errors — it provides a forum for plaintiffs at the expense of burdening 
defendants. 
This Part examines the impact of a weakened effects test. Under the 
reframed standard, if jurisdiction depends on the in-state effects of 
out-of-forum conduct and the court cannot determine whether that 
conduct was wrongful without sending the case to trial, then the court 
would have to dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction and require that 
suit be filed elsewhere. This more limited version of the effects test 
would tilt the balance of errors away from providing a forum for 
plaintiffs and toward a greater protection of defendants’ due process 
interests. 
A. Closing the Courthouse Door to Plaintiffs 
The strongest criticism of a more limited effects test is that it closes 
the courthouse door to plaintiffs, denying them a convenient forum in 
which to vindicate their rights.229 Our legal system has a strong 
tradition of protecting the individual’s ability to seek redress for harm. 
This principle is founded on the equitable notion of ubi jus, ibi 
 
 227 Clermont, supra note 14, at 1000. 
 228 Id. (“The aim is to minimize the sum of the costs, but the trick is to specify 
properly the sources and magnitudes of all the various costs.”). 
 229 See Spencer, supra note 36, at 222 (noting that a stronger effects test aids the 
“protection of unwitting victims from the burden of having to travel to the 
wrongdoers’ home states to vindicate harms committed against them, an interest the 
Calder Court explicitly intended to promote”). 
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remedium — where there is a right, there is a remedy.230 Although this 
principle is not unlimited,231 it is nevertheless a cherished value that 
some scholars have argued rises to the level of constitutional due 
process.232 
Limiting the reach of the effects test does not automatically block 
plaintiffs from accessing justice, though it does limit the number of 
available forums. Plaintiffs will generally still have the right to sue in 
the defendants’ home forum, where there would be general 
jurisdiction to resolve all disputes involving the defendant regardless 
of whether the forum has any connection to the particular lawsuit.233 
Thus, the access-to-justice problem is primarily practical rather than 
legal. Even though there is a forum with the legal power to hear the 
dispute, the plaintiff may not have the practical means to access the 
available forum.234 The problem is especially acute when the only 
potential forum is located outside the United States.235 
 
 230 Tracy A. Thomas, Ubi Jus, Ibi Remedium: The Fundamental Right to a Remedy 
Under Due Process, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1633, 1636 (2004). 
 231 See Christopher A. Whytock & Cassandra Burke Robertson, Forum Non 
Conveniens and the Enforcement of Foreign Judgments, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 1444, 1482 
n.188) (citing Kiyemba v. Obama, 555 F.3d 1022, 1027 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (“Not every 
violation of a right yields a remedy, even when the right is constitutional. Application 
of the doctrine of sovereign immunity to defeat a remedy is one common example. 
Another example . . . is application of the political question doctrine.”) (citations 
omitted)). 
 232 Thomas, supra note 230, at 1636. In addition, the constitutions of 40 states 
expressly protect the right to a remedy. Thomas R. Phillips, The Constitutional Right to 
a Remedy, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1309, 1310-11 (2003) (noting that there are two major 
variants of the state-level protections). The majority provision provides in essence: 
“That all courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done him in his person, 
property or reputation, shall have remedy by the due course of the law.” Id.  
 233 Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2853-54 
(2011) (“For an individual, the paradigm forum for the exercise of general jurisdiction 
is the individual’s domicile; for a corporation, it is an equivalent place, one in which 
the corporation is fairly regarded as at home.”).  
 234 The cost of litigating in an unfamiliar or distant forum is one that can affect 
both plaintiff and defendant. See, e.g., Redish, supra note 16, at 1133 (“The most 
immediate means by which the extension of a state’s jurisdiction could cause injustice 
to a litigant is through the imposition of significant burdens and expense, resulting 
from the need to travel to the forum in question and to transport evidence and 
witnesses long distances.”). Indeed, the relative costs and inconveniences may be 
balanced under the “reasonableness” prong of jurisdiction. See id. at 1137 
(“Inconvenience would presumably have to be measured comparatively.”). 
 235 See, e.g., Chang v. Virgin Mobile USA, LLC, No. 3:07-CV-1767-D, 2009 WL 
111570 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 16, 2009) (holding that Texas district court lacked personal 
jurisdiction over Australian defendant); see also Melissa A. Waters, Mediating Norms 
and Identity: The Role of Transnational Judicial Dialogue in Creating and Enforcing 
International Law, 93 GEO. L.J. 487, 538-49 (2005) (analyzing court access in cases 
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If plaintiffs cannot afford to sue outside their home jurisdiction, 
they may simply forgo their rights. Obviously, this situation is 
problematic for the harmed plaintiffs who lack access to a remedy. 
When harmed individuals forgo litigation in large numbers, regulatory 
interests may also suffer harm from underenforcement.236 One scholar 
found such an effect in the patent arena, noting that spurious patents 
may go unchallenged when potential plaintiffs — parties who have 
been accused of infringing potentially invalid patents — are unable to 
obtain personal jurisdiction over the patent holders in a convenient 
forum.237 
B. Protecting Defendants’ Due Process Rights 
Weighing against the desire to provide a remedial forum is the need 
to protect litigants’ due process rights. A narrower effects test would 
protect due process rights by giving potential defendants fair warning 
as to where they are subject to suit, ensuring that speech rights and 
intellectual property are adequately protected, and integrating modern 
electronic commerce and communications in a way that maintains the 
doctrine’s consistency. 
1. Minimizing Forum-Selection Costs 
One of the goals of the personal jurisdiction doctrine is to allow 
potential defendants to predict where they will be subject to 
jurisdiction, so that they may alter their behavior accordingly.238 The 
 
involving allegations of transnational defamation). 
It is also possible that the alternative forum would have less favorable substantive 
law; however, the Supreme Court has excluded this consideration from forum choice 
determination. See Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 255 (1981) (holding that 
a forum non conveniens dismissal was appropriate even though plaintiffs “may not be 
able to rely on a strict liability theory,” and “their potential damages award may be 
smaller,” as long as “there is no danger that they will be deprived of any remedy or 
treated unfairly”).  
 236 See Megan M. La Belle, Patent Litigation, Personal Jurisdiction, and the Public 
Good, 18 GEO. MASON L. REV. 43, 62 (2010).  
 237 Id. (alleging that home-forum unavailability “causes alleged [patent] infringers 
to forego declaratory relief and allows many bad patents to go unchallenged”). 
 238 World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980) (“The 
Due Process Clause, by ensuring the ‘orderly administration of the laws,’ gives a 
degree of predictability to the legal system that allows potential defendants to 
structure their primary conduct with some minimum assurance as to where that 
conduct will and will not render them liable to suit.” (citation omitted)); Charles W. 
“Rocky” Rhodes, The Predictability Principle in Personal Jurisdiction Doctrine: A Case 
Study on the Effects of a “Generally” Too Broad, but “Specifically” Too Narrow Approach 
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effects test, as currently applied, does not do a good job of this. Much 
of the lack of predictability comes from doctrinal inconsistency; as 
noted above, the judgments of courts in different circuits will come 
out differently even in cases where the facts are nevertheless 
substantially similar.239 This inconsistency substantially increases the 
costs of litigation, both to the litigants and to the court system.240 
Predictability would continue to be a problem even if courts were 
willing and able to accede to the principle that allows plaintiffs to sue 
in the location where they suffered harm. Under the purposeful 
availment standard, defendants can consciously choose where they 
will visit, enter into contracts, or market their goods; thus, in 
economic terms, the defendant may well be the least-cost avoider.241 
Under the theory of Calder, defendants could also choose not to 
commit intentional torts directed at plaintiffs in identifiable locations 
in order to avoid inconvenient litigation.242 Again, however, this 
theory assumes that the defendants actually committed such a tort. 
What is not predictable is where defendants will be accused of 
committing a tort — especially if, in fact, the defendant actually 
committed no wrongful conduct at all. Because potential defendants 
cannot predict such an accusation, they could not “structure their 
primary conduct”243 to avoid jurisdiction in inconvenient or 
 
to Minimum Contacts, 57 BAYLOR L. REV. 135, 137 (2005) (“Predictability insures both 
that nonresidents will be able to structure their transactions to avoid the sovereign 
jurisdictional prerogative of a foreign state and that litigants will have some guidance 
as to when a jurisdictional challenge may be appropriate.”). 
 239 See supra Part II.B. 
 240 Dustin E. Buehler, Jurisdictional Incentives, 20 GEO. MASON L. REV. (forthcoming 
2012) (manuscript at 33), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? 
abstract_id=1880975 (“[J]urisdictional litigation results in a tremendous social loss, 
regardless of the outcome of the dispute. If the plaintiff prevails, thousands of dollars 
have been spent on a fight that changed nothing. If the defendant prevails, resources 
allocated to the case up to that point are for naught.”). 
 241 See id. at 35 (noting that in a products liability case, “the manufacturer is in a 
better position to internalize the cost of litigating in a distant forum” because the 
defendant has more information about the risks of the product and the forums in 
which it is sold). 
 242 This view of the effects test is not limited to the United States. The High Court 
of Australia expressed a similar view in Dow Jones & Co. v Gutnick (2002) 210 CLR 
575 (Austl.) (“At least in the case of the publication of materials potentially damaging 
to the reputation and honour of an individual, it does not seem unreasonable, in 
principle, to oblige a publisher to consider the law of the jurisdiction of that person’s 
habitual residence.”). Such an obligation is likely to chill not just defamatory speech, 
however, but also protected speech that is highly critical of others. See infra Part 
IV.B.2. 
 243 World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297. 
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burdensome locations unless they cease to engage even in protected 
and desirable conduct, a consequence discussed below. 
2. Protection of Speech and Commerce 
By their nature, effects-test cases often involve potentially wrongful 
speech. When there are other types of contacts — physical presence, 
contractual relationships, or in-state marketing or sales — plaintiffs 
generally will not need to rely on effects-test jurisdiction.244 By the 
time these more traditional contacts have been ruled out, the only 
potential contacts left to support jurisdiction are out-of-state speech 
acts that may have an effect in state. Thus, for example, common 
causes of action may include “cases claiming trademark or copyright 
infringement, consumer or business fraud, and defamation.”245 
Although Calder suggested that First Amendment concerns do not 
belong in a personal jurisdiction analysis for fear of “double counting” 
the speech interest,246 others have disagreed.247 In this area, the Court 
seems to be undervaluing the speech issue — and, in particular, 
underestimating the impact of jurisdictional standards on maintaining 
a robust speech environment.248 There is little doubt that jurisdictional 
standards can influence primary conduct. In fact, due process in 
 
 244 See, e.g., Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 487 (1985) 
(concluding that franchise and contact activities could give rise to jurisdiction); Int’l 
Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 320 (1945) (basing jurisdiction on in-state 
commercial activity). 
 245 See Jeffrey Hunter Moon, New Wine, Old Wineskins: Emerging Issues in Internet-
Based Personal Jurisdiction, 42 CATH. LAW. 67, 67 (2002) (noting that these are the 
most common Internet-based personal jurisdiction issues). 
 246 Calder v. Jones 465 U.S. 783, 790 (1984) (“Moreover, the potential chill on 
protected First Amendment activity stemming from libel and defamation actions is 
already taken into account in the constitutional limitations on the substantive law 
governing such suits. To reintroduce those concerns at the jurisdictional stage would 
be a form of double counting.” (citation omitted)); Internet Solutions Corp. v. 
Marshall 39 So. 3d 1201, 1215 (Fla. 2010) (noting, but rejecting, the defendant’s 
argument that the court should consider First Amendment principles in construing 
Florida’s long-arm statute). 
 247 Kauffman Racing Equip., L.L.C. v. Roberts, 126 Ohio St. 3d 81, 2010-Ohio-
2551, 930 N.E.2d 784, at ¶ 81 (O’Donnell, J., dissenting) (noting that Calder forbade 
consideration of First Amendment protections at the jurisdictional stage, but 
concluding that the exercise of effects-test jurisdiction in an online defamation case 
“unnecessarily chill[s] the exercise of free speech”). 
 248 Not only does the Court discount the influence that jurisdiction may have in 
shaping primary conduct, it also discounts its expressive value. See Scott Dodson, 
Hybridizing Jurisdiction, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 101, 146 (forthcoming 2011) (noting that 
jurisdiction “performs an expressive role in affirming that certain limitations are 
important or fundamental”). 
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personal jurisdiction is premised on the idea that defendants order 
their affairs according to where they are willing and able to be 
subjected to the courts’ process; the Supreme Court has noted that the 
doctrine “allows potential defendants to structure their primary 
conduct with some minimum assurance as to where that conduct will 
and will not render them liable to suit.”249 
Given the Court’s expressed desire to allow potential defendants to 
structure their primary conduct with personal jurisdiction in mind, it 
seems likely that speech would be included in the conduct that that is 
influenced by jurisdiction. Other scholars have also pointed out that 
broad-based personal jurisdiction for tort claims can affect speech 
choices: 
Unlike most intentional torts, we do want to encourage people 
to engage in the underlying speech activity that gave rise to the 
tort, and the threat of distant litigation can inhibit that 
activity, as much or more than imposition of substantive 
liability. If I think I might be sued far from home, I am going 
to watch my tongue whether or not I think I will win the 
lawsuit.250 
If individuals can be haled into court based on a mere allegation that 
their speech is wrongful or defamatory, their speech will be chilled at 
least to some extent. It seems plausible that speech by individuals is 
more likely to be chilled than speech by corporations; on average, 
individuals are likely to have fewer resources and find it more 
burdensome to litigate in a foreign forum.251 Likewise, individuals may 
be especially deterred from criticizing businesses that have significant 
legal and financial resources to deploy in retaliation. Recent 
defamation suits over online consumer reviews evidence just such an 
attempt to crack down on allegedly wrongful speech.252 But if such 
 
 249 Burger King, 471 U.S. at 472. 
 250 Allan R. Stein, Personal Jurisdiction and the Internet: Seeing Due Process Through 
the Lens of Regulatory Precision, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 411, 422 (2004). 
 251 See Allyson W. Haynes, The Short Arm of the Law: Simplifying Personal 
Jurisdiction over Virtually Present Defendants, 64 U. MIAMI L. REV. 133, 165-66 (2009) 
(noting that a result of this disparity, “in some states, the long-arm statute only applies 
to corporate defendants or to associations and partnerships” and not to individuals). 
 252 See, e.g., BroadVoice, Inc. v. TP Innovations LLC, 733 F. Supp. 2d 219 (D. 
Mass. 2010) (involving a dissatisfied customer who created a website to post 
complaints and derogatory remarks about an internet telephone service); Kauffman 
Racing, 126 Ohio St. 3d 81, 2010-Ohio-2551, 930 N.E.2d 784, cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 
3089 (2011) (involving a dissatisfied customer who posted numerous criticisms on 
various websites devoted to automobile racing). 
  
1350 University of California, Davis [Vol. 45:1301 
speech is chilled, the public forum will suffer as consumer information 
will become more limited, and public opinion will become a less 
effective weapon in policing fraudulent or deceptive commercial 
behavior.253 
The same incentives that encourage or discourage speech can apply 
to commercial activity and the protection of intellectual property. 
Companies that believe their intellectual property is being infringed 
can make infringement claims to regulatory bodies or online 
marketplaces without fear that they will thereby subject themselves to 
an inconvenient or unexpected forum. Of course, the flip side of this 
protection is that the entities they accuse of infringement will have to 
defend before these same bodies — they will not have the option of 
bringing their accusers into their own jurisdiction to resolve the 
claims. As noted above, this may lead to overdeterrence if companies 
wrongfully assert infringement against innocent parties.254 
3. Better Integration of Online Activity 
Limiting the reach of the effects test also reduces some of the 
uncertainty surrounding online commerce and communication. The 
Internet facilitates exactly the kind of conduct that the effects test 
seeks to reach — it makes it easy for individuals to engage in conduct 
in one forum that gives rise to effects in another forum.255 When the 
 
 253 Frank and unfiltered consumer reviews allow customers to have more 
information about their business dealings and thereby reduce information asymmetry 
problems. See JAMES SUROWIECKI, THE WISDOM OF CROWDS: WHY THE MANY ARE 
SMARTER THAN THE FEW AND HOW COLLECTIVE WISDOM SHAPES BUSINESS, ECONOMIES, 
SOCIETIES AND NATIONS 57 (2004) (explaining the value of collective wisdom and 
noting that “[c]ollective decisions are most likely to be good ones when they’re made 
by people with diverse opinions reaching independent concludiosn, relying primarily 
on private information”); Behrang Rezabakhsh, Daniel Bornemann, Ursula Hansen & 
Ulf Schrader, Consumer Power: A Comparison of the Old Economy and the Internet 
Economy, 29 J. CONSUMER POL. 3, 3 (2006) (analyzing consumer power and 
concluding that “the Internet enables consumers (a) to overcome most information 
asymmetries . . . (b) to easily band together against companies and impose sanctions 
via exit and voice, and (c) to take on a more active role in the value chain and 
influence products and prices according to individual preferences”). 
 254 See sources cited supra notes 236-37 and accompanying text; see also Buehler, 
supra note 240, at 24 (“If private incentives to sue exceed the social benefit from suit, 
there likely will be an excessive number of lawsuits. However, the amount of litigation 
will be socially inadequate when the social benefits from suit exceed the private 
incentives.”). 
 255 Jack M. Balkin, Digital Speech and Democratic Culture: A Theory of Freedom of 
Expression for the Information Society, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 7-8 (2004) (“[T]he digital 
revolution makes it easier for content to cross cultural and geographical borders. Not 
only can speakers reach more people in the country in which they live, they can also 
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Internet first became a powerful force, courts were unsure of how to 
deal with Internet contacts, and early decisions adopted Internet-
specific tests rather than integrating them into a traditional personal 
jurisdiction analysis.256 
Some legal scholars, including two Supreme Court justices, have 
suggested that the personal jurisdiction doctrine requires special 
consideration of Internet issues. In the Court’s most recent decision, 
Justices Breyer and Alito refused to join the plurality opinion, in part 
because the case “does not implicate modern concerns” and would not 
provide a vehicle for answering questions relevant to cyberspace in 
particular: 
[W]hat do those standards mean when a company targets the 
world by selling products from its Web site? And does it 
matter if, instead of shipping the products directly, a company 
consigns the products through an intermediary (say, 
Amazon.com) who then receives and fulfills the orders? And 
what if the company markets its products through popup 
advertisements that it knows will be viewed in a forum?257 
Others, however, have taken an “unexceptionalist” position regarding 
cyberspace, arguing that special regulatory or jurisdictional rules are 
not needed, and that activities on the Internet should be integrated 
into the current legal structure.258 
 
interact with and form new communities of interest with people around the globe.”); 
Jacqueline D. Lipton, Cyberlaw 2.0, *8 (2011) (unpublished manuscript), available at 
http://works.bepress.com/jacqueline_lipton/12/ (“[A]ll online conduct involves 
information exchange.”). 
 256 See, e.g., Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119, 1124 
(W.D. Pa. 1997) (basing the jurisdictional determination on an analysis of whether 
the website was passive, interactive, or commerce-based). 
 257 J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2793 (2011) (Breyer, J., 
concurring). 
 258 See DAVID G. POST, IN SEARCH OF JEFFERSON’S MOOSE: NOTES ON THE STATE OF 
CYBERSPACE 166-71, 183-86 (2009) (adopting the term “cyberspace unexceptionalist”); 
see also Jack L. Goldsmith, Against Cyberanarchy, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 1199, 1202 (1998) 
(“Cyberspace transactions do not inherently warrant any more deference by national 
regulators, and are not significantly less resistant to the tools of conflict of laws, than 
other transnational transactions.”); Allan R. Stein, The Unexceptional Problem of 
Jurisdiction in Cyberspace, 32 INT’L LAW. 1167, 1191 (1998) (“[T]he personal 
jurisdiction cases to date suggest the courts are well on their way to working out a 
more-or-less coherent approach to the allocation of judicial authority over cyberspace 
controversies. As courts become more familiar with the technology, we can expect 
more sophisticated refinements. This suggests that the new technology of cyberspace 
does not, in general, confound our basic jurisdictional instincts.”); Veronica M. 
Sanchez, Comment, Taking a Byte Out of Minimum Contacts: A Reasonable Exercise of 
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Most courts now take a middle view: they recognize that there 
cannot be separate legal standards for online and offline activity, but 
acknowledge that jurisdiction standards must accommodate modern 
technological development.259 As others have pointed out, it is 
becoming “increasingly difficult to separate Internet activities from 
activities unrelated to the Internet,” and “the problems the Internet 
presents for personal jurisdiction doctrine [therefore] become the 
problems of personal jurisdiction doctrine generally.”260 Nonetheless, 
our personal jurisdiction standards will have to accommodate the 
realities of the networked world, just as the doctrine once had to 
integrate the issues arising from automobiles and modern travel.261 
Integrating online communication into a coherent personal 
jurisdiction doctrine requires acknowledging the ways in which the 
Internet has changed modern personal and commercial realities, as 
well as how those changes may influence jurisdictional questions. One 
major impact is the democratization of mass communications. In the 
past, we might have assumed that a libel defendant was likely to be a 
corporate entity that was capable of defending its legal interests in 
numerous jurisdictions;262 however, party status can no longer be 
assumed. As recent defamation cases demonstrate, we cannot predict 
 
Personal Jurisdiction in Cyberspace Trademark Disputes, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1671, 1717 
(1999) (“In making personal jurisdiction determinations in Internet cases, courts 
should not focus on the medium itself but should scrutinize the contacts at issue.”). 
 259 See, e.g., ALS Scan, Inc. v. Digital Serv. Consultants, Inc, 293 F.3d 707, 714 (4th 
Cir. 2002) (“Until the due process concepts of personal jurisdiction are reconceived 
and rearticulated by the Supreme Court in light of advances in technology, we must 
develop, under existing principles, the more limited circumstances when it can be 
deemed that an out-of-state citizen, through electronic contacts, has conceptually 
‘entered’ the State via the Internet for jurisdictional purposes.”). 
 260 Note, No Bad Puns: A Different Approach to the Problem of Personal Jurisdiction 
and the Internet, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1821, 1844 (2003). 
 261 Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 250-51 (1958) (“As technological progress 
has increased the flow of commerce between States, the need for jurisdiction over 
nonresidents has undergone a similar increase.”); Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352, 356 
(1927) (broadening jurisdictional concepts to account for modern transportation); see 
also Michael P. Allen, In Rem Jurisdiction from Pennoyer to Shaffer to the 
Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act, 11 GEO. MASON L. REV. 243, 287 (2002) 
(“The doctrine needs to develop if it is going to be able to address changes in society 
and technology that are certain to come.”). 
 262 ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 881 (E.D. Pa. 1996), aff’d, 521 U.S. 844 
(1997) (“It is no exaggeration to conclude that the Internet has achieved, and 
continues to achieve, the most participatory marketplace of mass speech that this 
country — and indeed the world — has yet seen. The plaintiffs in these actions 
correctly describe the ‘democratizing’ effects of Internet communication: individual 
citizens of limited means can speak to a worldwide audience on issues of concern to 
them.”). 
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whether either the plaintiff or the defendant will be a corporate entity, 
a small business, or an individual.263 Thus, whatever rules we apply 
must not presuppose that the party will have substantial litigation 
resources. 
The personal jurisdiction doctrine must also account for the number 
of places online communications can affect. Many scholars and 
commentators have noted the potentially worldwide impact of online 
activity.264 It may seem counterintuitive that, at the same time the 
Internet expands access to the world, principles of personal 
jurisdiction would contract in response and narrow the number of 
places in which an individual would be called to defend. Nevertheless, 
such a contraction makes sense.265 In the past, it may have been a 
reasonably safe assumption that defendants who were able to act 
nationally or internationally had the ability to defend themselves on a 
similarly large scale.266 The democratizing effect of the Internet means 
that this is no longer a safe assumption; while it has empowered 
individuals to act on a large scale, it has not given them the resources 
to defend on a similarly large scale.267 As a result, a narrower personal 
jurisdiction doctrine may be needed to counteract a jurisdictional 
sphere that the Internet would otherwise broaden too much.268 
 
 263 See Balkin, supra note 255, at 8 (“The Internet gives people abilities that were 
previously enjoyed only by large commercial enterprises; it offers them access to an 
infrastructure for sending information worldwide.”). 
 264 See, e.g., Martin H. Redish, Of New Wine and Old Bottles: Personal Jurisdiction, 
the Internet, and the Nature of Constitutional Evolution, 38 JURIMETRICS J. 575, 582 
(1998) (explaining the growth of the Internet and its enabling of worldwide 
communication). 
 265 See Lipton, supra note 253, at 39 (“[T]he proportion of Internet cases raising 
jurisdictional issues is likely to be higher than the equivalent proportion of non-
Internet cases. Thus, Internet law creates greater risks of jurisdictional inquiries 
detracting from inquiries about developments of substantive rights.”). But see Danielle 
Keats Citron, Minimum Contacts in a Borderless World: Voice over Internet Protocol and 
the Coming Implosion of Personal Jurisdiction Theory, 39 UC DAVIS L. REV. 1481, 1543 
(2006) (expressing concern that limitations on personal jurisdiction in the Internet 
era could create a “wholesale elimination of extraterritorial state authority and a cloak 
of immunity over all remote communications”). 
 266 See, e.g., Hess, 274 U.S. at 356 (expanding the doctrine of personal jurisdiction 
to allow states to exercise jurisdiction over non-resident motorists). 
 267 See POST, supra note 256, at 163 (“The international legal system is premised, at 
bottom, on the existence and mutual recognition of the physical boundaries that 
separate sovereign and independent lawmaking communities — nation-states — from 
one another . . . . But on the inter-network, information moves in ways that seem to 
pay scant regard to these boundaries, and mapping them onto network activity is a 
profoundly difficult challenge.”). 
 268 Id. at 167 (“A place where just about everybody can have significant effects on 
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C. Weighing the Balance 
Regardless of how it is done, reconciling the effects-test doctrine 
will result in significant costs to litigants. Limiting the reach of the 
doctrine removes a convenient litigation forum from plaintiffs who 
have suffered harm. While other forums remain, not all plaintiffs will 
have the resources necessary to access them. As a result, some 
plaintiffs will be left without a remedy. If too many plaintiffs are 
unable to enforce their legal rights, then we are likely to see problems 
with underenforcement of legal obligations such as those we may be 
seeing now in the patent context.269 
Conversely, the costs are even larger when defendants can be haled 
into a forum based on the in-forum effects of out-of-forum conduct 
that has not yet been proven wrongful. In this situation, defendants 
would not be able to predict where they may reasonably face lawsuits. 
The unpredictable risk of litigating in a distant forum may also chill 
consumer speech and reduce commercial activity. These effects are 
magnified as the Internet takes on an increasingly greater role in 
commerce and communications. 
While there are costs on both sides of the equation, the costs of 
court access can be minimized in ways that do not implicate the 
personal jurisdiction doctrine. Expanding civil access-to-justice 
programs could offset a general concern about the cost of court 
access.270 Offering non-jurisdictional litigation incentives could 
mitigate more specific regulation concerns regarding the 
underenforcement of substantive rights.271 For example, Congress 
passed legislation awarding statutory damages and attorneys’ fees in 
cases brought against violators of the Fair Debt Collection Practices 
Act, thereby creating incentives for attorneys to take these cases when 
 
just about everyone else, everywhere, simultaneously, is a place where the ‘significant 
effects principle’ cannot sensibly resolve jurisdictional questions.”). 
 269 See sources cited supra note 236 and accompanying text. 
 270 Mark C. Brown, Comment, Establishing Rights Without Remedies? Achieving an 
Effective Civil Gideon by Avoiding a Civil Strickland, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 893, 894 (2011) 
(“Calls to expand the right to appointed legal counsel stem from the many legal needs 
left systemically unmet and the current legal aid system’s inability to satisfy indigent 
litigants’ demands for legal assistance . . . . Adverse outcomes are significantly more 
likely for unrepresented litigants.”). 
 271 Margaret H. Lemos, Special Incentives to Sue, 95 MINN. L. REV. 782, 782-83 
(2011) (analyzing “devices designed to increase the rate of private litigation: attorneys’ 
fee shifts for prevailing plaintiffs, and damage enhancements such as multipliers or 
punitive damages”; concluding that while some “suit-boosters” may increase the 
number of suits filed, they do not fully meet regulatory goals). 
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plaintiffs otherwise could not afford the cost of litigation.272 
Alternatively, the expansion of third-party litigation funding may 
increase court access without changing jurisdictional doctrine.273 
Although there are significant costs on both sides of the equation, 
the risks of a broader effects test outweigh the costs of a narrower test. 
Furthermore, access-to-justice issues can be addressed outside of 
jurisdictional doctrine, while the potential harm to defendants’ liberty 
interests can be protected only by limiting jurisdictional exposure. The 
risk that some plaintiffs would be deterred from filing suit is offset by 
greater jurisdictional predictability, a more robust speech 
environment, and greater integration of electronic commerce and 
communication. 
Nor would a narrower effects test significantly disrupt current legal 
practice. While some cases would be decided differently, the effects-
test doctrine has been so beset by conflicts that it is possible to find 
many other cases where the courts were already applying a narrower 
standard than Calder seemed to permit.274 Under the proposed 
standards, cases such as Dudnikov and Kauffman Racing could not go 
forward in the plaintiff’s chosen forum; if the plaintiffs wanted to 
pursue those cases, they would have to file suit where the defendant 
was subject to jurisdiction — most likely in the defendant’s home 
forum. This resolution largely eviscerates the Calder effects test: even 
the Calder case itself, which adopted the effects test, might have come 
out differently if the Supreme Court had not assumed for 
jurisdictional purposes that the defendants’ conduct was wrongful, 
and Shirley Jones would likely have had to sue in Florida, where the 
defendant writer and editor lived and worked. 
On the other hand, under the reframed standard, cases that have 
been criticized as conflicting with Calder would form the basis for a 
new standard. For example, cases like New Haven Advocate, 
Broadvoice, and Accession would correctly deny jurisdiction.275 In these 
cases, the court cannot determine before trial whether the defendants 
in fact engaged in wrongful conduct targeted at the forum. As a result, 
the effects test could not be employed as a basis for jurisdiction. The 
 
 272 15 U.S.C. § 1692(k) (2006). 
 273 Maya Steinitz, Whose Claim Is This Anyway? Third-Party Litigation Funding, 95 
MINN. L. REV. 1268, 1338 (2011) (“Third-party financing of litigation will increase 
access to justice and encourage private enforcement of the law . . . . Most important, 
however, litigation funding will reduce systemic inequalities in our legal system . . . in 
a way that will increase the equality of arms in any given litigation and make it more 
likely that more kinds of litigants will be able to play for rules.”). 
 274 See supra Part II. 
 275 See supra Part II. 
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courts may still examine the facts to see if there is evidence of other 
types of purposeful availment — business travel, contracts with forum 
residents, in-forum sales, or targeted advertising — demonstrating 
efforts toward purposeful availment of the benefits and protections of 
a forum. Otherwise, jurisdiction should be denied. 
CONCLUSION 
Ever since the Supreme Court adopted the effects test for personal 
jurisdiction in Calder v. Jones, the test has been applied in a haphazard 
manner. Even when cases possess strikingly similar fact patterns, 
courts have reached inconsistent conclusions on the threshold issue of 
jurisdiction. The cases become possible to reconcile only when the 
courts’ implicit assumptions about the underlying merits of the cases 
are made explicit. When a court is willing to accept the plaintiff’s 
allegations as true, it is likely to find that jurisdiction is appropriate 
based on the defendant’s “express aiming” of tortious conduct directed 
at the forum. When a court is unwilling to accept the plaintiff’s 
allegations of tortious conduct as true, it is less likely to find 
jurisdiction appropriate; because there is no finding of tortious 
conduct, there can be no finding of express aiming. 
Once hidden assumptions about the merits are made explicit, the 
standard of proof for personal jurisdiction becomes much more 
salient, and it correspondingly becomes much more difficult for a 
court to make a finding of effects-test personal jurisdiction. The court 
can no longer assume for jurisdictional purposes that the plaintiff’s 
allegations of wrongfulness and harm are true; instead, those 
allegations must be proven by a preponderance of the evidence. Nor 
can the court base jurisdiction on the uncontested, but nonwrongful, 
actions that have an effect in the target forum. The court is therefore 
left with two difficult options: waiting until trial to resolve the issue of 
personal jurisdiction, or narrowing the effects test to require plaintiffs 
to sue elsewhere. 
Although neither option is without cost, the better option is to 
adopt a more limited version of the effects test. It is true that limiting 
the reach of the doctrine removes a convenient litigation forum from 
plaintiffs who have suffered harm, and some plaintiffs will not have 
the resources necessary to access alternative forums. However, 
although these costs are not insignificant, they can be ameliorated 
with access-to-justice initiatives outside the jurisdictional arena. The 
costs of a broader effects test cannot be reduced in the same manner. If 
the jurisdictional question is not resolved until trial, the broader 
standard will cause defendants to forfeit the very interests that the 
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personal jurisdiction doctrine is meant to protect. The broader 
standard would also increase the cost of forum selection for both 
parties, inhibit legitimate speech, and potentially disrupt the growth of 
online commercial activity. 
Many courts have already adopted narrow interpretations of the 
effects test, perhaps in an unconscious recognition of these costs. 
When the Supreme Court next hears an effects-test case, it should 
endorse a more limited construction of the test that recognizes the 
inextricability of the merits from the jurisdictional decision. Such a 
test would require the district court to abandon the effects test 
whenever it cannot make a pretrial determination that the defendant 
has in fact engaged in wrongful conduct. In these cases, the court 
should instead perform a traditional examination of purposeful 
availment of the forum state’s benefits and protections. In the absence 
of such indicia, the court should not exercise personal jurisdiction 
over the defendant. 
